Discipline, health and madness: Foucault's *Le pouvoir psychiatrique*

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ABSTRACT

This article provides a reading and analysis of Foucault's 1973–4 lecture course *Le pouvoir psychiatrique*. It begins by situating the course within the wider context of Foucault's work, notably in relation to *Histoire de la folie* and the move of the early 1970s to the conceptual tools of power and genealogy. It is argued that *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* is a rewriting of the last part of *Histoire de la folie* from the perspective of these new conceptual tools. Analysis then moves to more thematic concerns, showing how this course enriches our understanding of Foucault's work on the sources of power, the individual and the family, and the spaces of the disciplinary society. Particular focus is given to the role of the army, public health, the hospital, children, women and hospital architecture. The article concludes by showing how the themes of this course, while not worked up for publication themselves, point the way to concerns in Foucault's later work, notably *The History of Sexuality* and collaborative work on urban medicine and habitat.

Key words architecture, children, Foucault, power, public health, women

This article provides a reading of Foucault's 1973–4 lecture course *Le pouvoir psychiatrique*, published in France in 2003 and forthcoming in English translation.[1] Of the thirteen courses Foucault gave at the Collège de France, this was the fourth to be published.[2] The courses provide an invaluable glimpse into Foucault's working practices, showing how the material he delivered in lectures both intersected and diverged from the publications that appeared in his lifetime. In particular the courses thus far published shed a great deal of light on how the original plan for *The History of Sexuality* might have looked; examine several other technologies of the self, especially around Christianity and Greek thought; and enable us to resituate the work on governmentality in its historical context. The course under consideration here dates from the period between *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *Discipline and Punish*, and affords us a good view of the transition between the works of the 1960s and those of the mid-1970s.

While the brief summaries Foucault wrote at the end of each course for the *Annuaire du Collège de France* have long been available – both individually, in a collected edition in French (1989), and in English translation (1997b: 11–106) – the courses themselves often depart in quite important ways.[3] This is certainly the case with *Le pouvoir psychiatrique*. In the summary, Foucault discusses urban medicine, hospitals, diseases, Pasteur and anti-psychiatry – although there is little about these themes in the course as a whole.[4] Indeed, the opening part of the summary makes it seem that the three lectures Foucault delivered in Rio in October 1974 on anti-psychiatry, social medicine and the hospital (1994: Vol. III, 40–58, 207–28, 508–21; 2004d; 2000: 134–56; forthcoming) may have traded on the course, which ran from November 1973 to February 1974, or at least be similar in some way (see Elden, 2003: 241, 249). An attempt to rationalize Foucault's prodigious productivity perhaps, but not the case. Rather what we have in the Rio lectures is a development of the research conducted that year in his seminar on 'the history of the hospital institution and hospital architecture in the eighteenth century' (2003: 352; 1997b: 50). Foucault elaborated many of these themes in his work with Collège de France colleagues in the ensuing years in a study of *Les machines à guerir* – curing machines (Foucault *et al.*, 1979[1976]). Foucault's introduction to the former volume is 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century' (1984: 273–89), which functions as a summary of such concerns, and can be seen as a broadening of the analysis of *The Birth of the Clinic* beyond the hospital into medicine in society more generally (see Elden, 2003).

It seems likely that the work in the seminar and the material prepared for Rio may have shaped the retrospective presentation of the course, of which the analyses are complementary in a number of ways. In both the course and the Rio lectures, and in the work that came from the seminar, we find Foucault returning to previous subjects of analysis with new perspectives,

especially regarding the question of power and with a willingness to broaden the institutional analyses to the impact of psychiatry and medicine on society more broadly. What Foucault does in the course under consideration here is to fill out a number of issues that are well known in his work, but equally he provides a number of surprises, including topics that were not in the summary, particularly some very revealing work on the question of sexuality.

In this article I begin by situating this course in relation to Foucault's earlier researches into madness and psychiatry, particularly highlighting three problems he identifies in that earlier work. These problems highlight methodological issues that he aims to correct through his work in this course. I then discuss three key themes: the sources of power, particularly highlighting the role of the army and religion; the emergence of the individual and the politics of the family; and the role of spatial control in disciplinary power. To varying degrees these are all familiar themes in Foucault's work, but they are enriched, altered and contextualized by their presentation in this course. In reading this course we can gain a clearer picture of how Foucault moved through various positions in his career, and see other potential ways in which his ideas might be applied.

REWRITING *HISTOIRE DE LA FOLIE*

If there is one key way to understand *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* it is as a rewriting of *Histoire de la folie* (translated in abridged form as *Madness and Civilisation*) from the perspective of *Discipline and Punish*.[5] One of the things that emerges from reading the full version of *Histoire de la folie* is how much of the later Foucault was prefigured by this text. That is, there is a general concern with themes such as health, confinement, sexuality and classification, which would be deepened and discussed in *The Birth of the Clinic*, *The Order of Things*, *Discipline and Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality*. Indeed, in a 1978 interview Foucault suggested that *Histoire de la folie* was the 'first chapter', the beginning of a programme of study (1978: 20). In this course what we find is not just a development of material on these kinds of themes, but an explicit reworking of ideas in that book, what Robert Castel has called 'a second reading' of the earlier work (cited in P.-H. Castel, 2003).

There are a number of ways this can be thought through. The first is that by the time he delivered this course Foucault had moved his work through some important theoretical shifts. Most explicitly he had begun to describe his works as genealogies rather than as archaeologies. Or, more accurately, as this course among other texts makes clear, he described them as *both*. This is important, because it shows that they are in a sense two halves of a

complementary approach. Indeed one of the most convincing ways of under-
standing archaeology is through the lens of *L'Archéologie de savoir* (1969),
where it is concerned with a historical excavation of the conditions of possi-
bility of statements of knowledge within specific discourses. This somewhat
narrow focus of research can be found in both this book and *Les mots et les
choses* (1966). Following this line would demonstrate that the genealogical
works – anticipated in essays such as 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' and
the inaugural lecture at the Collège de France (1994: Vol. II, 136–56; 1984:
76–100; 1970) – are concerned with the relation between knowledge and
power, a more explicitly politicized approach that looks at the practices that
partner, produce and depend on discourses.

But *Histoire de la folie* is a text that certainly does this already, as indeed
does *The Birth of the Clinic*. In a well-known quotation Foucault recognizes
this:

> When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking
> about, in *Madness and Civilisation* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, but
> power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and
> never had such a field of analyses at my disposal. (1994: Vol. III, 146;
> 1984: 57; see Davidson, 2001: 204)

In a sense then *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* is a return to *Histoire de la folie*
with the word and the field of analyses at hand, just as the Rio medicine
lectures could be said to be a similar return to *The Birth of the Clinic*. The
guiding theme is therefore the insight that 'knowledge functions as power'
(2003: 187).

Although this is to my mind a useful way to understand the course, *Le
pouvoir psychiatrique* only returns to the latter part of the earlier book, essen-
tially the discussion of Tuke and Pinel and the 'liberation' of the mad for moral
imprisonment. In the book this is followed by a concluding chapter that
supposedly valorizes or romanticizes the mad, discussing Nietzsche, Artaud,
Van Gogh, Hölderlin and others.[6] This move from concrete analysis of insti-
tutions and practice to more literary analysis could be said to characterize
much of Foucault's work in the 1960s. There is the more literary output of the
early to mid-1960s (for example, the English-language collection *Language,
Counter-Memory, Practice* [1977a], and a range of other pieces which origi-
nally appeared in *Critique* and *Tel Quel* [see also 1998]), including essays on
writers such as Deleuze, Bataille, Klossowski, Hölderlin, and Flaubert, a
concern with art (1966; 2004c) and a generalized concern with madness or
thought at the limit (see Sabot, 2003). But there is another strand to Foucault's
work, made most obvious in *The Birth of the Clinic*, which is much more
explicitly political. These two strands are most strikingly evident when we
remember that Foucault's study of the novelist Raymond Roussel (1992[1963])
was published almost simultaneously with *The Birth of the Clinic*.

The first strand, on what might be said to be the limits of language, was taken to a conclusion of sorts in *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Biographical elements such as the events of May 1968 and Foucault's experiences in Tunisia may be said to have contributed, but in the late 1960s and early 1970s Foucault's work returned to the relation between discourses and knowledges on the one hand and practices and institutions on the other, and this around the time he began at the Collège. His candidacy presentation is revealing in this regard. Not only does Foucault not mention his more literary output, but he explicitly states that *The Order of Things* was an 'experiment', where he suggested that it was 'to neutralise the whole practical and institutional side but without abandoning the idea of going back to it one day' (1994: Vol. I, 843; 1997b: 6).

The first course, accordingly to the summary at least, although entitled *La volonté de savoir* ('The Will to Knowledge') shares no more than its title with the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, and contains discussions of Nietzsche and Aristotle (1989: 9–16; 1997b: 11–16). In a sense it was the second and third courses, on *Théories et institutions pénales* and *La société punitive* that opened up the issues around the relation of power to knowledge most explicitly (1989: 19–51; 1997b: 17–50). It is clear that Foucault was working towards a book on this project, which of course becomes *Discipline and Punish*, although his involvement with the Groupe d'Information sur les prisons (GIP) also provides an indispensable backdrop (see Artières, Quéro and Zancarini-Fournel, 2003; Vaccaro, 2005). As he says to his audients at the beginning of *Le pouvoir psychiatrique*, this course is 'a little bit discontinuous in relation to that which I have spoken to you about in the two preceding years, but not completely' (2003: 3). The approach and methodological issues remain, but the subject matter changes. It is worth remembering that the GIP was followed by a group looking at asylums, the GIA – Groupe d'Information sur les asiles.

All this background is important for a course that needs to be seen in a particular historical context. *Discipline and Punish* functions as an indispensable counterpoint: the book was one for which the research appears to have been done at the time of the course's delivery, although the writing was not completed until August 1974 (the book appeared in February 1975). There is some material shared between the book and the course, but not nearly as much as might be expected given their temporal proximity. However, *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* is not yet the *History of Sexuality*, although several themes of the original six-volume thematic plan of that project come up in places. The following projected volumes were to have included studies of confession, women, children, the perverse, and populations and races. In sum then, this course can be seen as a reworking of *Histoire de la folie* in the light of *Discipline and Punish*, and a leading towards the *History of Sexuality*.

THREE PROBLEMS

In the first lecture of the course Foucault explicitly suggests that he wants to rework the themes of the last part of *Histoire de la folie*, but with a certain number of differences. As he says, that work is the 'background' for the work being undertaken, but 'it has a certain number of things which are perfectly open to criticism, above all in the final chapter where I ended up precisely with the power of the asylum [*pouvoir asilaire*]' (2003: 14). There are three displacements that he wants to make in relation to *Histoire de la folie*:

i.   a shift from analysis of representations to an analytic of power;
ii. a shift from violence to the microphysics of power;
iii. a shift from institutional regularities or state apparatus to 'dispositions' of power.

Following Foucault, let me work through these in more detail (see also Lagrange, 2001: 132–4).

First, in *Histoire de la folie* Foucault accords a privilege to questions of 'perception of madness', to representations, to traditional or other images, to phantasms, to *savoir*, 'knowledge'. In part this is a response to the more literary work, but this 'second volume', as he explicitly calls it, rather than offer a 'history of mentalities, of thought', instead undertakes an analysis of 'a *dispositif* of power'. *Dispositif* is one of the most difficult words in Foucault's work to translate adequately, meaning straightforwardly 'apparatus' but also the arrangement or set-up of a web of practices and their attendant discourses (see Foucault, 1994: Vol. III, 298–329; Deleuze, 1989; and Elden, 2001b: 110–11). Foucault's question is how this *dispositif* of power produces a certain number of *énoncés* (scientific statements), discourses, and forms of representation? (2003: 14; see 1994: Vol. III, 300–2). In this sense the *dispositif* of power – a broader development of the episteme of knowledge – should be seen 'as a productive instance of discursive practice' (2003: 14).

> The discursive analysis of power would be, in relation to that which I call archaeology, at a level (the word 'fundamental' doesn't appeal to me much), let's say at a level, which permits us to grasp the discursive practice at the precise point where it forms. This formation of discursive practice, to what must it refer, where must we search for it? (2003: 14)

This work therefore opens up various questions of power, and the relations of this power to discursive practices (2003: 15). We see here Foucault working through in rough, schematic form the central theses he would advance in books and other writings in the period from 1975 on, and to which he would continually return in interviews.

Second, Foucault admits he was very ignorant of the anti-psychiatry and

psycho-sociological literature in the period of writing *Histoire de la folie*. In part because of this, he made implicit or explicit appeal to three notions, which appear to him as *serrures rouillées*, 'rusted locks', which prevented him from advancing. These were violence, the institution and the family. In relation to violence he states that this was an attempt to combat the hagiographies of mental health reformers, and to stress the physical force they used. Now he considers that this would have been better analysed through power, and the role of the body: 'All power is physical, there is between the body and political power a direct connection [*branchement*]' (2003: 15). Rather than some totalizing understanding of violence this work requires an attempt to grasp the capillary nature or level of power, a species of the microphysics of bodies (2003: 16). Foucault suggests that the 'moral treatment' of the mad (Haslam, cited in Foucault, 2003: 10; see 1976) is *discipline*. Knowledge becomes revealed as power. As well as violence, Foucault reconsiders the reading given of the institution. In 1973 he suggests that rather than some unified thing called an institution, of which the asylum took a privileged place, he should instead consider relations of individuals and the collectivity, and the rules that regulate them (2003: 16). Again then, issues of power arise – 'relations of force in the tactical dispositions which traverse institutions' (2003: 17, see also 34). Foucault had argued this earlier in the course: 'You have therefore a tactical functioning of power, or rather, it is this tactical disposition which permits power to be exercised' (2003: 8). Finally, the family as analysed in *Histoire de la folie* strikes him as problematic. The suggestion there that Pinel or Esquirol introduced the family model into the institution of the asylum seems wrong to him on rereading their works. He now suggests that the father figure in the space of the asylum is produced later, only really in the 20th century (2003: 17). Foucault therefore suggests that violence is not the right word; that the institution is not the correct level of analysis; and it is not the family that we should speak of (ibid.).

The third point is related. Although we should turn our attention away from the institution to wider issues of individual and collectivity, we should not use this as a reason to turn to an analysis of state apparatuses, such as Louis Althusser had proposed in a famous essay (1971 and see 1995). Foucault notes that 'it is clearly the institution – as a place, a form of distribution, and a mechanism of these power relations – that antipsychiatry attacks' (2003: 350; 1997b: 48). This was one of the themes of the Rio lectures (1994: Vol. III, 40–58; 2004d). The course manuscript has an important paragraph on this that was not delivered:

> We should not use the notion of state apparatus, because it is much too large, much too abstract to indicate these immediate powers, minuscule, capillary, which are exercised over bodies, the behaviour, gestures, and times of individuals. The state apparatus doesn't take account [*ne rend*

pas compte] of this microphysic of power. (2003: 17, footnote *; see 1994: Vol. II, 622, 772)[7]

In sum, Foucault suggests there are three replacements necessary in relation to *Histoire de la folie*: a microphysic of power for violence; tactic for institution; strategy for family model. He notes that this is an attempt to avoid psycho-sociological vocabulary, and recognizes that he has used 'a pseudo-military vocabulary' (2003: 18). According to the manuscript, examples like that of George III – to be discussed below – are not 'theatrical episodes but a ritual, a strategy, a battle' (cited in Lagrange, 2001: 139). Given the turn his work took to questions of war and the military model – both here and in other places, notably *Discipline and Punish*, 'Questions on Geography' and *Society Must Be Defended* (1975; 1994: Vol. III, 28–40; 1997a) – this is perhaps not entirely surprising. It also appears from the 1972 and 1973 summaries that some of these issues were discussed at that time (see 1989: 19–51; 1997b: 17–50).

THE SOURCES OF POWER

Foucault is well known for having proposed a move from an understanding of power on the Hobbesian model of sovereignty to a more dispersed and less centralized model, a understanding of power that is less possessed than exercised and which works throughout society rather than from a centralized source. In this course he provides a related yet strikingly different example. This is the story of George III, king of England, and his madness (2003: 21–32).[8] The transfer of power from a monarch to the doctors is symptomatic of a more generalized shift from a macrophysic of sovereignty to a microphysic of power. Foucault argues that what we have is not a transition from one sovereign power to another, but from sovereign power to another type of power. 'In the place of this decapitated and uncrowned [*decouronné* – literally de-crowned] power, is installed a multiple anonymous power, pallid, without colour, which is at base the power which I will call discipline' (2003: 23). This is power as discipline, not power that is 'concentrated in a named and visible individual, but that only produces an effect on its target, on the body and person even of the uncrowned king, who must be rendered "docile and submissive" by this new power' (2003: 23). In this new discipline, the figure of the doctor (Willis) is eclipsed (2003: 24), because the shift is less from one figure to another than from sovereignty to discipline (2003: 28).

The understanding of power, as disciplinary power, is for Foucault a certain way in which political power touches and affects bodies, in all their actions and reactions, even down to the 'soft fibres of the brain'. Foucault elaborates: 'To put it another way, I believe that disciplinary power is a

certain modality, entirely specific to our society, that one can call the synaptic contact of body-power' (2003: 42). Once again the manuscript includes a critique of Marxist (specifically Althusserian) approaches: 'This method-ologically implies that we leave to one side the problem of the state, the state apparatuses, and that we get rid of the psycho-sociological notion of author-ity' (2003: 42, footnote *).

The source of this new form of power is twofold in this course: religious practices and the military. Religious communities were not entirely on the margins of the Middle Ages, but equally were not at its centre. Through the 14th and 15th centuries we can trace the emergence of disciplinary measures of everyday life, in pedagogy, and the generalized discipline of the convent and asceticism (2003: 42–3). These increasingly spread through society as a whole in the following centuries, taking centre stage in the 19th. Foucault discusses the Frères de la Vie commune, earlier models from the 11th and 12th centuries, Cistercian monasteries, and the orders of Cluny and Cîteaux (2003: 55, 66–71). He also looks at colonization by the Jesuits in South America, and suggests that the republics that were set up in particular in Guaranis, in Paraguay, known as 'communist', 'were in reality disciplinary microcosms' (2003: 71).

The importance of these models is in the control of time, the general surveillance and individualization of the people within them, and a perma-nent penal system. This penal system was in a sense very indulgent compared to Europe at the time: there was no death penalty, no *supplice* and no *torture* (both of these words are usually translated as 'torture' in English, but tend to have a different sense in French, the former pertaining to more public displays of cruelty) but instead an absolutely permanent system of punish-ment, which continued throughout the life of the individual (2003: 71). Although Foucault also makes reference to the grand *renfermement* of the classical age (2003: 71), which he analyses in both *Discipline and Punish* and *Histoire de la folie*, in this course these religious models allow him to raise a whole range of general questions about politics, surveillance and discipline that are in many ways the key themes of this course (see 2003: 6–7). His analysis therefore is of the contrast between sovereign power (without his being entirely happy with the word) and disciplinary power (2003: 44).

Sovereign power is power shot through with asymmetry, founded on some anterior event that it always carries with it, such as divine right, conquest, victory, act of submission, a vow of fidelity, rights of blood, etc. (2003: 44). On this model, 'the verso of sovereignty, is violence, is war' (2003: 45), a claim that Foucault would pursue in detail in the 'Society Must Be Defended' lecture course (1997a). Relationships within sovereignty are not isotopic (the same in all places), they are not organized rationally by relations of classifi-cation, not a hierarchical table of elements (2003: 45). Disciplinary power, on the other hand, does not work on asymmetry, nor on one-way relations of

two, but is more totalizing and organizing. The example given is military discipline, which Foucault claims before the Thirty Years War (1618–48) did not really exist, armies being more agglomerations of disparate forces and mercenaries. Of course, as he would later recognize in *Discipline and Punish*, classical Rome provided the model for this later disciplinary model. From the middle of the 17th century then, and it is not unrelated that in this same era modern states start to emerge, with the allowing of standing armies in the Peace of Westphalia for the territorial princes, a system of discipline emerges in the army, based around career soldiers. These soldiers are not only engaged during war, but also in peace, except for periods of demobilization. Foucault notes that they receive pensions, and thus in later life continue to think of themselves as retired soldiers (2003: 48).

Once again the same kinds of issues as in the religious communities emerge: 'Military discipline commences as a general confiscation of the body, time, life' (2003: 48). Generalizing this point Foucault contends that 'all disciplinary systems, I believe, tend to be an occupation of the time, the life and the body of the individual' (2003: 49). Somewhat problematically Foucault contends that disciplinary power does not need ritual or ceremony, but more convincingly notes that it is not discontinuous but continuous (ibid.). The army is again used as example, with exercises of discipline and so on (ibid.), and the Prussian army under Friedrich II is used as an example of corporal exercise, and dressage, training and breaking-in, of the body (2003: 50). Here again we find the generalized regulation and surveillance, punishment of the minor transgression (2003: 52–3). Foucault notes that before the regulated army there was no such thing as a deserter as there was no disciplinary structure (2003: 55). Although Foucault gives a parallel example of the regulations in the Gobelins tapestry factory in Paris (2003: 51, 53), the army here plays a major role in the analysis.

Foucault suggested that war was the verso of the relations of sovereignty, whereas the verso of the relations of discipline is punishment (*la punition*), a kind of 'punitive pressure' that is 'at the same time minuscule and continuous' (2003: 53). Verso in this sense seems to mean more than simply reverse, but rather also the limit case, the extreme form. Foucault uses this model of discipline throughout the course, as the following sections of this article will demonstrate. As well as these extreme forms, often centred in institutional settings despite his earlier admonition, Foucault also goes on to look at the generalized surveillance of populations, and of regimes of medicine and health (2003: 247–8). Like in the Rio lectures he moves between analyses of hospital-based medicine and wider concerns for public health. Here he suggests that pathological anatomy, analysed of course in *The Birth of the Clinic*, and the appearance of statistical medicine (a medicine of large numbers) are the two main epistemological instruments of the 19th century in medicine (2003: 248). What we have here, just as he would later analyse

through sexuality, is a juxtaposition of individual bodies and collective bodies.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE FAMILY

One of Foucault's key points is that we usually trace the emergence of the individual in thought and European political reality as an effect of capitalist economy and the claiming of political power by the bourgeoisie, along with a philosophical-juridical theory that comes from Hobbes in the 17th century and can be traced through to the French Revolution. Foucault argues rather that the constitution of the individual is a product of a certain technology of power, namely discipline, 'proper to the power which is born and develops from the classical age, which isolates and divides, which comes from the game of bodies' (2003: 59). Capitalist economy and power, and the philosophical-juridical theory, need to be seen against this backdrop. There are two types of individuals according to this analysis: the juridical individual, an abstract subject with individual rights that no power can remove, except through consent by contract; and the individual as a historical reality, an element of 'productive forces, as an element also of political forces; and that individual is a *corps assujetti* [a subjectified body], held in a system of surveillance and submitted to procedures of normalisation' (2003: 59).[9]

Foucault goes on to argue that the human sciences – in French the *sciences de l'homme* as well as the *sciences humaines* – have their express purpose to conjoin, *jumeler*, to twin, or to couple the juridical and disciplinary individual (2003: 59). There is a strong relation here to the analysis of the birth of 'man' in *The Order of Things*, an argument that is expressly politicized here, just as the analysis of *mathesis* is in a related way in the *Society Must Be Defended* course (1997a: 161–6, 170; see Elden, 2002: 135–8). For Foucault, here:

> It is of this *oscillation* between the juridical individual, ideological instrument of the claiming of power, and the disciplinary individual, real individual of its physical exercise, it is of this *oscillation* between the power which one claims and the power that one exercises that is born this illusion and this reality which one calls Man. (2003: 60)

Accompanying this analysis of the individual are some detailed studies of the notion of the family. Foucault's examples seem to be of an almost entirely dysfunctional family, where the women are prostitutes or hysterical and the children are idiots or always masturbating. But despite the extreme examples, Foucault's analysis is of fundamental importance to his analytic of collectivity.[10]

Foucault's claim is that the disciplinary society is not the model for the family, rather that the family bears more comparison to sovereignty. This is

not to say it is a hangover from the past, but somewhat paradoxically that the family is an essential piece of the disciplinary system (2003: 81–2). The family is for Foucault the hinge, the *charnière*, 'the absolutely indispensable point of engagement [*le point d'enclenchement*] to the functioning of all disciplinary systems' (2003: 82). There is an integral relation of the family to school, to the army, to work, etc. (2003: 82–3).[11] Foucault's general point is that the family plays a crucial role in fixing individuals into disciplinary systems, playing a similar role to the body(ies) of the king in sovereign systems (2003: 83; see Kantorowicz, 1957; Neocleous, 2003). In a sense, rather than being dysfunctional itself, the family is where dysfunction can be observed and controlled, functioning as a mechanism within disciplinary society.[12]

> Disciplinary power is parasitic on domestic sovereignty, [as it] requires the family to take the role of the process of deciding the normal and the abnormal, the regular and the irregular, demands the family sends these anomalous, these irregulars, etc. to it. (2003: 116–17)

The family is certainly one of the *dispositifs* of sovereignty, and has an especial role in those ways of thinking, particularly around the power of the father, but Foucault contends that it also plays a role in disciplinary societies, tied to economic questions of productivity. This role is different, obviously, but so too is the family itself. Increasingly it is 'concentrated, limited, intensified', it is reduced more and more down to the crucial relations of man–woman and parents–children (2003: 84), the nuclear family (see 1999: 229–39; Elden, 2001a: 101). These changes are in part related to class, with the formation of the urban proletariat, to work and housing conditions, and to child labour (2003: 84–5). In sum then, between the disciplinary panopticism of society as a whole – an issue that I will return to and analyse below – and the sovereign family there is a continual back-and-forth relation (2003: 85).

Foucault contends that the relation of the asylum and the family is crucial (2003: 96ff.) and gives an example of one where Brierre de Boismont is the father and his wife is the mother (2003: 114). (Given that de Boismont lived from 1797 to 1881 this seems to contradict his claim that the family model of the asylum is 20th-century.) To my mind these analyses are less interesting than the general claim that the asylum functions both as 'disciplinary system and equally a place of formation of certain type of discourse of truth' (2003: 96). In this we see the relation between power and knowledge relations, or the political relation in the production of truth. This is not to say that other disciplinary places do not have this relation, nor that they do not have a relation to the family, but Foucault argues that this is particularly found and concentrated here (ibid.).

Foucault is often criticized for the lack of attention to women in his

work.[13] Although his original plan for the *History of Sexuality* contained a volume on this subject, treatment is almost completely lacking in the actually published version. While this course in no way replaces such a volume or entirely answers such criticisms it is certainly the most detailed treatment to appear to date, and unless there are more surprises in the forthcoming volumes, is likely to be the best glimpse we have of what Foucault thought about the subject. The projected fourth volume of the original plan was to have been entitled *La femme, la mère, l'hystérique* ('Woman, Mother, Hysteric'). It is the last category which receives treatment here, although as mentioned above, prostitutes make a brief appearance as an example of economic-political disciplinary mechanisms (2003: 112–13).

The hysteric, for Foucault, occupies a particularly important place in the history of psychiatry. Detailed analysis of this aspect of the course cannot be pursued here, but is necessary for a more nuanced assessment of Foucault's relation to feminism. Foucault contends that what happened at Salpêtrière (where, coincidently, he would himself later die), was a kind of founding moment for psychiatry (2003: 137). As he later notes in the course summary this was not a neutral medical experience: 'Charcot actually produced the hysterical fit he described' (2003: 347; 1997b: 45).[14] Foucault is also interested in the relation between psychiatric power and hysterical resistance, describing hysterics 'as the true militants of anti-psychiatry' (2003: 253). He also discusses the relation between hysteria and epilepsy (2003: 311), an analysis that would be developed in *Les Anormaux* lecture course when he shows how religious possession is in part an early form of what would come to be called mental convulsion (1999: 187–212). His analysis of the neurological body (2003: 299ff.) is also important for understanding how discipline always directed its resources towards the corporeal, and for showing the emergence of issues of sexuality. As he claims, the neurological body, and the conflict between the body of the mad and the psychiatrist is entirely sexual. Struggles of power and domination are evident in the space of the asylum. 'This body, no longer the neurological body, is the sexual body' (2003: 325). This point is crucial and will be returned to in the conclusion.

Foucault's analysis of children – also intended to form a volume of the original *History of Sexuality* plan – is more detailed. Whereas in *Les Anormaux* course the analysis had almost exclusively been on the theme of masturbation – the theme of the intended book – here the analysis, while covering that issue in part, is much broader. This is because Foucault claims that children play an important role in the birth of psychiatric power, effectively that it develops from the psychiatrization of children (2003: 199). In the literature of the time Foucault finds that therapeutic inventions against madness cannot begin too young, and that it is important therefore not to wait until the subjects are adults (2003: 124–5). Equally, as is well known, incidents from childhood life are particularly significant in analysis (2003:

125). Mechanisms of surveillance used against children – largely around masturbation and their sexuality more broadly – provide models for a generalized surveillance concerning the policing of normal and abnormal behaviour (2003: 124).

If there is one key innovation in this text concerning children however, it is that of the treatment of the imbecile, the idiot, the mad child (2003: 201ff.). Foucault goes so far as to suggest that 'the education of idiots and of the abnormal is psychiatric power in its pure state' (2003: 212). Why are idiotic children so important? Foucault's answer is that they are dangerous because they masturbate in public, they commit sexual offences (*délits*), they are *incendiaires*, 'fire-starters' (2003: 218). More generally the claim is that in the 19th century the question of anomaly in psychiatry is one that affects children rather than adults – leaving aside the question of physiology and anatomo-pathology. At this time, 'it is the adult who is mad; on the other hand, the child is the one who is abnormal' (2003: 219). All sorts of problems can be traced back to the child.

The child therefore is seen as 'the bearer of anomalies' and Foucault discusses how around the figure of the idiot a whole range of practical problems is orientated: 'from the liar to the poisoner, from the pederast to the homicide, from the onanist to the arsonist', all this generalized field around the figure of anomaly, at the heart of which is 'the backward child [*l'enfant arriéré*], the feeble child, the idiot child' (2003: 219). It is through these practical problems that psychiatry becomes something which does not seek to control and correct madness, but a much more generalized and dangerous power over the abnormal, 'the power to define who is abnormal, to control, and correct' (ibid.). Foucault's claims here are important in terms of the kind of analysis he is undertaking. His assertion is that 'anomaly is the individual condition of possibility of madness' (2003: 274).

The disjuncture between the mad and the abnormal child is for Foucault therefore 'one of the fundamental traits of the exercise of psychiatric power in the nineteenth century' (2003: 219). There are three consequences that he thinks can be traced from this. First, a series of disciplinary regimes emerge from the ideas behind this, which lead to a generalized science and power over the abnormal. This can be found in the discipline of schools, the military, and the family. Wider social controls arise and develop from the treatment of the child (2003: 219–20). Second, the links between the abnormal child and the mad adult lead, in the second half of the 19th century, to two key concepts: the notion of instinct and that of degeneration. The instinct, which is analysed in much more detail the following year (2003: 213, 220; 1999: 122ff., 260–6), is important in terms of the moral tone adopted in response; whereas degeneration, particularly in the work of Morel (1857), shows the intrusion of evolutionary biology into psychiatry, although it predates Darwin (1859), and is closer to the idea of inherited characteristics found in

Lamarck, who was extremely important in his native France.[15] In *Society Must Be Defended* degeneracy is linked to the general analysis of biological-racist discourses (1997a: 53, 225). The political question here is that of the spreading of anomaly into future generations: important, as it is the disposition to anomaly that makes possible the madness of adults (2003: 220–1). The relation between anomaly and madness might be seen in this way: 'anomaly leads to madness and madness produces anomaly' (2003: 221). Third, that the field of psychoanalysis emerges here, albeit in rather crude form. We can find it at work in the system of exchanges between children and parents, between ancestors and descendants, and in these questions of instinct and degeneration. For Foucault it is precisely in the generalization of the child and anomaly and not in that of the adult and illness that the object of psychoanalysis is formed (2003: 221).

SPACE AND THE PANOPTICON

In the course summary Foucault talks about 'the example of medicine, with the space connected to it, namely, the hospital' and sees the latter as 'a place where the true illness blossoms forth' (2003: 341; 1997b: 39). He goes on to discuss the idea of a hospital as a place where all the misleading and confusing contexts of disease could be removed so that it could be seen in its pure state: 'a botanical place for the contemplation of species, a still-alchemical place for the elaboration of pathological substances' (2003: 342; 1997b: 40). As is well known, Foucault, who regularly used spatial language, did not use this vocabulary merely as metaphor, but made several concrete analyses of the geographical aspects of the issues he studied. As he said in 1978, 'what I study is an architecture, a spatial organisation' (1978: 3).[16]

The hospital is 'a place of observation and demonstration, but also of purification and testing'. The key issue therefore is 'should the hospital, a reception structure for illness, be a space of knowledge [*connaissance*] or a place of testing [*d'épreuve*]' (2003: 342; 1997b: 40)? In other words is the hospital a place where disease should be stopped (for the purpose of cure) or cultivated (for examination and learning)? In the summary there is an interesting aside on Pasteur and the way his work on contagion showed that physicians did not merely produce the truth of disease (i.e. an intellectual project of truth) but through ignorance of truth had spread and thereby produced disease *itself*. The relation today to the concern over diseases such as MRSA in hospitals is telling. 'Up to that moment, the hospital space and the physician's body had had the role of producing the "critical" truth of disease; now the physician's body and the overcrowded hospital appeared as producers of disease's reality' (2003: 343; 1997b: 41; more generally see Latour, 1988).

> By determining the agent of the sickness and by pinpointing it as a single organism, it enabled the hospital to become a place of observation, of diagnosis, of clinical and experimental identification [or mapping, *repérage*], but also of immediate intervention, of counter-attack against the microbial invasion. (2003: 342; 1997b: 40–1)

This is the 'other story', which Foucault does not treat in detail (nor does he refer to it in the course itself), but which he hopes these 'few notations' may help us to understand, 'the position of the madman and the psychiatrist in the space of the asylum' (2003: 343; 1997b: 41). Extending the medical issue, the role of psychiatrist is that of 'producing the truth of illness in the hospital space' (2003: 347; 1997b: 45). Once more, *The Birth of the Clinic* and the Rio lectures provide a useful background, but instead in the course itself there is extensive discussion of, among other themes, the 'organisation of the space of the asylum' (2003: 13).

The course itself begins with a description of the ideal asylum of Fodéré in 1817 – an asylum that is not altogether dissimilar from the château of de Sade's *One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom* (2003: 3). But despite this magical and romantic setting, in the inside 'order reigns, law reigns, power reigns' (2003: 4). There is the 'perpetual, permanent regulation, of time, activities, actions; an order which surrounds bodies, which penetrates them, makes them work, is applied to their surface', but also bears its mark on the nerves and soft fibres of the brain (ibid.). For the workings of power, bodies appear as 'surfaces to cross and volumes to work' (ibid.; see 1994: Vol. II, 143; 1984: 83). Foucault also discusses the use of the medical gaze, which is 'constitutive of medical knowledge and the criteria of its validity, [and] has as its effective condition of possibility a certain relation to order, a certain distribution of time, of space, of individuals' (2003: 4). Discipline is, in this sense, a distribution of bodies, of their actions, comportments, speech (ibid.). There is a twofold issue here: this disciplinary order is both necessary for exact observation and the condition for permanent recovery (ibid.).

In an anticipation of the analysis of *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault notes the crucial elements of the disciplinary system:

i.   spatial fixation;
ii. optimal extraction of time;
iii. application and exploitation of bodily forces;
iv. constitution of constant surveillance and immediate punitive power;
v.   organization of authorized [*réglementaire*] power which in its functioning is anonymous, non-individual, but which allows a *repérage*, a mapping, of subjectivized individuals. (2003: 73)

Foucault's analysis here shows the accumulation of people alongside accumulation of capital, a particular distribution of the workforce, presented in 'all

their somatic singularities' (2003: 73, and see 74). We have here a recognition of the workings of capital in the disciplinary society. Although Foucault is often admonished for ignoring such issues, it seems more likely, as here, that he is usually simply analysing complementary but neglected issues.

> Discipline, is a tactic, a certain manner of distributing singularities, but according to a schema which is not classificatory, to distribute spatially, to permit the temporal combinations [*cumuls*] which allow having effectively, on the level of the productive activity, the maximal efficiency. (2003: 74)

In discipline, as opposed to earlier models which are both exceeded by and the condition of possibility of this new organization, 'tactic replaces taxonomy and with it the man, the problem of the body, the problem of time, etc.' (2003: 75).

In this course we find an idea that would be the subject of further analysis by Foucault and a research team at the Collège de France: the hospital as a 'curing machine'.

> That is to say the architectural character itself, the organisation of space, the way in which individuals are distributed in that space, the way in which they circulate, the manner which they observe [*regard*] and in which they are observed, it is all this which has therapeutic value itself. The curing machine, in the psychiatry of this period, is the hospital. (2003: 103; see Foucault *et al.*, 1979)

The institution is therefore 'a large and unique body where walls, rooms, instruments, nurses, the supervisors [*surveillants*] and the doctor are the elements which have, of course, different parts to play, but are essentially for the function of playing for an ensemble effect'. This naturally works in different ways at different times: sometimes the key role is played by the general system of surveillance, sometimes by the doctor and sometimes to spatial isolation (2003: 163).

It is here that the Panopticon emerges in the text, as disciplinary power takes an 'absolutely generalized social form' (2003: 43). This and the confrontation between George III and his servants are, for Foucault, two near-contemporaneous 'historic and symbolic points of the emergence and the definitive installation of disciplinary power in society' (ibid.). This power goes beyond what can be analysed in the functioning of the institution of the asylum: 'it is from the functioning of disciplinary power that we can comprehend the mechanism of psychiatry' (ibid.). Foucault's general analysis of the Panopticon and the panoptic character of disciplinary power (1975; 2003: 54) is well known, and I will not discuss it at length here. What is important is that Foucault notes the importance of this 'spatial disposition' (2003: 103) in the functioning of a hospital rather than a prison. In this course and the

attendant seminar research we can now recontextualize a remark in an inter-
view where Foucault noted that he had discovered the Panopticon in study
of hospital architecture (1994: Vol. III, 190). The other context for the Panop-
ticon in this course is the discussion of Jesuit missions in Paraguay, the army,
workshops, workers' cities (2003: 65ff.).

    Nor should we forget that, even in Bentham, the Panopticon was never
merely a prison. Bentham's text is the place where Foucault finds a 'very clear
formalization, very remarkable, of the microphysics of disciplinary power'.
We are accustomed to thinking of the Panopticon as a prison, but 'in fact,
Bentham's Panopticon is not a model for a prison, or it is not only a model
for a prison; it is a model, and Bentham says this very clearly, for a prison,
but also for a hospital, for a school, a workshop [*atelier*], an orphanage. It is
a form, I would say, for all institutions' (2003: 75). And yet, even this formula
may be misleading. Bentham does not even say that it is a schema or diagram
for institutions, but a mechanism, by which power in an institution is magni-
fied and multiplied. It is the idea of the Panopticon as constituting a
Herculean force and giving spirit power over spirit. This is both found in the
mechanism of the Panopticon and in the 'general disciplinary form' (2003:
76). This remark is followed by a reading of the space of the Panopticon
(2003: 76–80; see 1994: Vol. II, 594–5; 1975: 233–5).

    The point being made is that if the hospital is such a 'curing machine' then
it is not on the model of the family, but as a 'panoptic machine', it is 'as a
panoptic apparatus [*appareil*] that the hospital cures' (2003: 103).

> It is, in effect, a machine to exercise power, to guide [*induire*], distrib-
> ute, and apply power according to the Benthamite schema, even if,
> obviously, the actual architectural arrangements [*dispositions*] of
> Bentham's design are modified. (2003: 103)

This is important. Foucault is sometimes criticized for generalizing Bentham's
ideal plan into a model for institutions that do not look like it. Here he is
making it clear that hospitals often utilized the general idea rather the exact
model. There are several crucial elements of this, of which he highlights four.
First, the idea of permanent visibility is retained, but instead of the circular
Panopticon of cells, or a dormitory, model hospitals substitute an *architec-
ture pavillonaire*, of small individualized units (2003: 103–4). Second, the
centralized surveillance is not in the form of a tower of anonymous power,
but a managerial building, which allows analysis of the other buildings, what
we might call 'the pyramid surveillance of observation [*la surveillance pyra-
midale des regards*]', of the 'guards, nurses, supervisors, physicians, who all
make some connections according to a hierarchical model, and which culmi-
nates to the chief-doctor, only responsible to the asylum'. The administrative
and medical power cannot be disassociated in this: we have the explicit
coupling of 'power–knowledge' (2003: 104). Third, the principle of isolation

and individuation with therapeutic value is followed. Just as Bentham's cells have a double opening and backlighting, so too does the model of Esquirol (2003: 105). Fourth, and a point already made, is the idea of continual punishment, that is, of each and every minor transgression.

In the last of these Foucault notes the principle of 'no restraint' put forward by some reformers, with the abolition of means of physical constraint, the removal of the chains and the decrease in physical violence. Ultimately Foucault does not think this is all that important in terms of the policies actually being employed, suggesting that punishment continues. In one of the more gruesome parts of the course he does, however, go into some detail about various mechanisms utilized – such as fixed chairs which people were locked into, handcuffs, the muffs/mufflers that keep hands in front of the body [*les manchons*], straitjackets, gloves that may be tightened to keep the hands pinned to the thighs, coffins of wicker that people were locked into, dog collars with spikes under the chin (2003: 106). He is clearly fascinated by these 'corporeal apparatuses', and indeed he comes up with a three-part typology for them:

i.   apparatuses of guarantee and proof – things which prevent certain types of behaviour, prohibit certain desires; the chastity belt is the ideal type;
ii. apparatuses for extracting truth, through gradual intensification, quantitative growth, such as water-torture or the *strappado*; the latter is a form of torture with a rope tied around the hands, thrown over a beam, the individual hoisted up and left hanging, or occasionally dropped a certain distance. It was used on Machiavelli among others (see Wootton, 1994: xi);
iii. means of marking the force of power on the body such as branding, torture [*tenailler*] or burning the regicide (Foucault, 2003: 106–7).

But there is a fourth kind, which appears in the 19th century, particularly in the asylums, which includes the various 'orthopaedic instruments' used for the straightening [*redressement*] and dressage of the body. These are instruments of continuous action, with a progressive effect, which ultimately make themselves unneeded. An example is a collar with iron spikes, which, if the wearer keeps the head straight and upright, will not be felt (2003: 107). The model for this is clearly not the family, but the barracks, with its parades and inspections; the workshop; certain types of agricultural practice in the colonies; and schools. Is it not remarkable that prisons are not mentioned (2003: 108)? It is also worth noting, given the impact of Foucault's work on post-colonial studies, the references he makes to colonial disciplinary regimes (see, for example, 2003: 110, 127).

As well as being a disciplinary place, 'the asylum is a space which is marked medically' (2003: 176; see also 186). Psychiatric *savoir* plays a particular role, but there is a very material, corporeal element involved. Differences are constituted between the curable and the incurable; the calm and the agitated;

the obedient and the non-submissive; those capable and those incapable of working; those to be punished or left alone; and the level of surveillance required (continual; from time to time; not at all), are related to the spatial organization of the institution itself. It is this distribution which striates the internal space of the asylum rather than medical nosographies (2003: 177–8). Struggles in the space of the asylum are a grappling between bodies – the subjectified body of the mad and the institutional body, 'extended in the dimension of the institution, of the psychiatrist' (2003: 186). Foucault makes much of this point:

> The asylum must be conceived as the body of the psychiatrist; the institution of the asylum, it is nothing other than the ensemble of regulations that this body effects through its relation to the body of the subjectified madman in the interior of the asylum. (2003: 186; see 214)

If the machinery of the asylum and the organism of the psychiatrist are the same thing (2003: 180), we can see all sorts of material elements of the production of *savoir*, the power relations of the space of the asylum as a body – the ears, eyes, speeches, gestures, the cogs in the machine (2003: 185). Foucault claims that in this we can '*repérer* one of the fundamental traits of what I call the microphysics of the power of the asylum' (2003: 186).

> The body of the psychiatrist must be present everywhere. The architecture of the asylum . . . is always calculated in such a way that the psychiatrist can be virtually everywhere. He must be able to see everything with a single glance [*regard*], and with a single walk oversee [*surveiller*] the situation of each of his patients; he must be able, at each moment, to make a review of the entire establishment, of the patients, the personnel, himself; he must see everything, and everything must be reported to him: that which he does not see himself, the supervisors, entirely under his command [*à sa docilité*], must tell him, such that he is continually, at every moment, omnipresent inside the asylum. He recovers the entire space of the asylum with his gaze, his ears, his gestures. (2003: 179)

The psychiatric hospital is therefore a 'space of inquiry and inspection, a kind of inquisitorial place' for the production of truth. Disciplinary space is also used in the education and moral treatment of the idiot children: 'Training [*apprentissage*], for example, of the linear distribution of bodies, individual places [*emplacements*], gymnastic exercises – the complete use of time' (2003: 215). The mechanisms for training and putting these children to work are also shown in the second striking image of *Discipline and Punish*, Léon Faucher's House for Young Prisoners (1975: 12–13).

TOWARDS THE LATER FOUCAULT

Towards the end of the course Foucault opens a parenthesis to discuss the history of truth in general (2003: 235ff.). On the one hand there is a common relation of scientific knowledge to a ground in truth, a truth that is absolute for all times and spaces. But there is another kind of truth, which has a geography and a calendar (or at least a chronology) (2003: 236). It also has its privileged and exclusive operators, and this is what might be called a non-universal version of truth. In this sense it is truth as a relation not of *connaissance* but of domination and victory, of power (2003: 237). Foucault is clearly more interested in the second series, which he says he has been tracing in his other courses (2003: 238). There are three themes or 'dossiers' of this relation – judicial practice; psychiatry; and pedagogy and childhood (2003: 239). These three themes have been treated in the opening salvo of courses at the Collège, the as-yet-unpublished courses on *Théories et institutions pénales* and *La société punitive*; the course under consideration here; and *Les Anormaux*. In all this his aim has been one of

> ... showing that scientific demonstration is at base only a ritual, showing that the supposed universal subject of knowledge is in reality only a historically qualified individual according to a certain number of realities, showing that the discovery of truth is in reality a certain modality of the production of truth; knocking down [*rabattre*] that which is given as the truth of observation [*constatation*] or as the truth of demonstration, to the level [*socle*] of rituals, the status [*socle*] of qualifications of the knowing subject, the system of truth-event, this is what I call the archaeology of knowledge. (2003: 238, see also 256, n. 13)

In this we can see the relation of power to knowledge. The technology of truth is linked to the event, strategy, the hunt. It is for this reason that Foucault would pursue the thesis that knowledge as power functions as war, at least until he felt he could go no further (see 1994: Vol. III, 94–5; 1997a). More broadly we can see how the archaeological and genealogical approaches are different yet complementary formulations, where the genealogy of *connaissance* is 'the indispensable historical *envers* of the archaeology of *savoir*' (2003: 239).

In late 1973 and the early part of 1974 Foucault was therefore concerned with many of the themes that would occupy him at least until his sabbatical year of 1976–7, after which his work took a number of detours through Christian thought, models of government, ethics and technologies of the self. The lectures in *Les Anormaux* are cut very much from the same cloth as this course, and there are numerous continuities of both style and substance. In particular the course develops material on the family and the control of populations, and it opens with a discussion of psychiatric power in criminal

trials (1999: 3–11; see Keck and Legrand, 2003). It therefore forms a bridge between *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* and *Discipline and Punish*, which appeared while *Les Anormaux* was being delivered, and though it contained some material on these topics it was largely a return to the themes of the previous two lecture courses. But while *Les Anormaux* was clearly a project designed to try out material for the original plan of the *History of Sexuality*, the vast bulk of the content of *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* seems never to have been intended for publication.

This should give us pause about the worth of the analyses themselves, in that they are sketchy and partial, and lack the rigour of rewriting and further research. However, to go through the course cataloguing Foucault's mistakes, to merely validate or critique, would be to entirely miss the point of these lectures' importance. What we have here is a writer speaking, thinking on his feet, providing potential avenues for his own research and openings for other future analyses. I have sought rather to indicate how this course is situated in relation to Foucault's other writings, and to show what conceptual tools and modes of analysis are worked through.

In this regard a number of valuable insights can be gleaned. We can see clearly here that the models of the disciplinary society were never merely the prison – as a superficial reading of *Discipline and Punish* might suggest – but the army, religious institutions, and the hospital, both the psychiatric hospital and that concerned with general medicine. An oft-forgotten element is also public health, analysed in the Rio lectures to which I have made regular reference, but also in the collaborative work on 'curing machines' (Foucault *et al.*, 1979) and the study Foucault edited entitled *Politiques de l'habitat* (1977b).[17] Indeed, in *Les Anormaux* Foucault suggests that he may have been insufficiently clear in *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* about the role of psychiatry in relation to medicine. He suggests that psychiatry in the 18th and 19th centuries was not really a branch of general medicine, but part of public hygiene. It is not insignificant, he notes, that some of the first works on psychiatry appeared in the *Annales d'hygiène publique* (1999: 109).[18]

Equally we can see the importance of psychiatric medicine, particularly in relation to the body of women, to the birth of the *dispositif* of sexuality:

> In forcing open the doors of the asylum, in ceasing being madwomen in order to become patients, in finally entering into a relation with a true physician, that is to say the neurologist, in providing him true functional symptoms, the hysteric, for their greater pleasure, but doubtless for our larger misfortune, gave to medicine the power over sexuality. (2003: 325)

If this point takes us beyond the analysis offered here, it does underline the key point being made: that reading Foucault's lectures offers invaluable context and nuance to the works he chose to publish in his lifetime.

Importantly, the lectures show the continuities of his concerns; with greater clarity demonstrate how the topics of his major works interrelate; and illustrate how he returned to earlier works with new perspectives, conceptual frames and examples. In addition, as *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* clearly illustrates, they show many of the avenues he chose not to pursue.

NOTES

1   An earlier version of parts of this paper was given at Purchase College, State University of New York in March 2004. I am grateful to Morris Kaplan for the invitation, and to the audience for their useful comments. Portions were also given at Lo sguardo di Foucault conference, University of Palermo, Sicily in May 2005, following a kind invitation from Salvo Vaccaro and Michele Cometa.
2   The previous three courses were 1997a, 1999 and 2001; since *Le pouvoir psychiatrique* was published two more have appeared (2004a; 2004b).
3   For discussions of the content and context of these lectures see Zarka (2000); Zancarini (2001); Jouhaud (2002); Gros (2002); and le Blanc and Terrel (2003). There has been limited discussion in English, except of the '*Il faut défendre la société*' course (see particularly Dillon and Neal, 2006). A study by O'Farrell (2005) makes extensive use of the new lectures in an overall analysis of Foucault's work; and on the implications for the late Foucault see also Miller (2005); Harrer (2005). See also Elden (2001a; 2002; 2005).
4   Anti-psychiatry is a major theme in the summary, but is barely mentioned in the course itself. At the end of the first lecture of this course Lagrange notes that the manuscript has a lengthy discussion (ff. 11–23) but this was not delivered (2003: 18, footnote *; see also an omitted remark at 137, footnote *). Equally Foucault notes that he prefers the term 'institutional critique' to 'anti-psychiatry' (2003: 41). He has clearly been reading David Cooper, Ronald Laing and Lucien Bonnafé.
5   There was a debate in the early 1990s about the abridgement and whether criticisms of the book would still hold if the full version was read. This began with a piece by Colin Gordon (1990), and led to several responses and a reply from Gordon. They are collected in Still and Velody (1992); a full English translation is forthcoming.
6   It is worth noting a difference between the English and French editions here. In the French these are the last two chapters of the third part – chs IV, 'Birth of the Asylum', and V, 'The Anthropological Circle' – whereas in English there is no division into parts and the final chapter becomes merely a 'Conclusion' with much of the material removed (1976).
7   It is notable that there are relatively few references to Foucault's contemporaries in this course. Just as in *Discipline and Punish* (1975: 32, n. 1), perhaps the most important influence in the background is Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, although this is only mentioned in the manuscript (2003: 88, footnote *). On this, see, among many others, Ottaviani (2003). As *Discipline and Punish* also notes, the work of Robert Castel is important too. See 2003: 88, footnote *, and 198, n. 41; and R. Castel (1992).

8   For a reading of Alan Bennett's play *The Madness of George III* in relation to
     Foucault, see Margaroni (2005).
9   This issue of the norm, the normal, and the abnormality that is measured against
     it, bears relation to Georges Canguilhem's work (1978) and the discussion in *Les
     Anormaux*. This course makes only brief reference to Canguilhem (2003: 200).
     See, however, the more extensive discussion in the following year's course (1999:
     29–48) and, for a discussion, Elden (2001a: 95, 102–4). More generally see Ewald
     (1992).
10   Many of the points made in this course are developed in much more detail in
     Donzelot (1979). Donzelot was influenced by Deleuze and Foucault, but also,
     as Deleuze points out, by Castel (Deleuze, 1979: xi).
11   As an aside it is perhaps worth noting that a near homophone of *charnière* is
     charnier, which means either a mass grave, a charnel house or a scene of massacre.
12   I owe a caution on this point to Colin Gordon.
13   The literature on this is extensive. For two recent and useful contributions see
     McLaren (2002) and Taylor and Vintges (2004).
14   This can be compared to the discussion of Pasteur's insight into the spread of
     contagion in the hospital below.
15   On this theme more generally see Pick (1989); and Dowbiggin (1991), who notes
     the relation of these themes to heredity more generally. Foucault's presentation
     to the collège had mentioned heredity in relation to plants as a theme to be
     researched. See 1994: Vol. I, 844–5; 1997b: 7–8; and Davidson (2001: 25–7).
16   On this aspect of Foucault's work generally, see Philo (1992); Hannah (2000);
     Elden (2001b); Legg (2005); Crampton and Elden (2006).
17   For a reading of these collaborative works, see Elden (2006).
18   Dowbiggin (1991: 140) notes that the full title was *Annales d'hygiène publique
     et de médecine légale*, and that it was founded in 1829. It was in the *Annales* that
     Foucault discovered the case of Herculine Barbin. More generally, see Goldstein
     (2001).

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