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Taking the Measure of the *Beiträge*

Heidegger, National Socialism and the Calculation of the Political

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ABSTRACT: This article provides a political reading of Martin Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. One of the central themes of the *Beiträge* is crucial to understanding why Heidegger moved into a position of critical distance from the Nazi regime, because it is an attempt to comprehend what lies behind the events of the time. This is the notion of the politics of calculation, the issue of measure, which relates closely to Heidegger's late concerns with technology. Through readings of Heidegger on Protagoras and Descartes, the role of calculation in the forgetting of being, and the notions of machination, race, and worldview, I show how the *Beiträge*, and particularly its explicit political context, is valuable in evaluating Heidegger's own career, his political position and politics more generally.

KEY WORDS: *calculation*, *Descartes*, *Heidegger*, *National Socialism*, *politics*, *technology*

This article provides a political reading of Martin Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. For students of his thought, the publication of the *Beiträge* has been of great importance. Although it was written in the years 1936–8, it was first published in 1989, the centenary of his birth and some 13 years after his death. It has recently been translated, with significant attendant problems, as *Contributions to Philosophy: Of Enowning* by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly.[1] The *Beiträge* is a vast book, over 500 pages in the German original, and it has often been seen as Heidegger's second major work, ranking with *Being and Time* in its importance.[2] The book we have is something of a workshop, a working out in rough form of a number of ideas that – originally intended for Heidegger's eyes only – are slowly brought to public attention in his lectures and publications. Although some of its crucial themes are introduced in earlier pieces, notably the

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lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, many do not appear in published work until the 1950s or 1960s.[3]

As is well-known, a shadow hangs over Heidegger's work: his political involvement with the Nazi party when he served as Rector of Freiburg University between 1933 and 1934. This has been comprehensively explored in recent years, so I will not go into detail about the facts here.[4] What characterizes much of the literature is one of two main strategies – exonerating Heidegger through a separation of the man from the thought, or simply damning his thought because of the actions. As some of the better recent literature has recognized, neither of these is adequate to the matter at hand: rather we need to investigate how the thought relates to the political.[5] There are a number of ways this could be done – one would be to investigate why he allied himself to National Socialism in the first place, another why he continued to believe it had potential for greatness, a third why he felt it had in practice failed. It is the last that I am concerned with here, although I have no wish to downplay the importance of the previous two. Equally, if the relation of his thought to his political career has been less well examined, even more rare – for obvious reasons – have been attempts to utilize his thought for political purposes.

The *Beiträge* is therefore of interest to students of political theory, because here I believe we find Heidegger coming to terms with some of the issues behind his Nazi allegiance. The *Beiträge* postdates Heidegger's explicit political career, but is in part a product of it, and needs to be situated within the context of the time. To take a few examples, the Nuremburg laws were promulgated in 1935; September 1936 saw the Four Year Plan announced; the *Anschluß* with Austria, the Munich Agreement and *Kristallnacht* all happened in 1938.[6] The political themes of the *Beiträge* are not disconnected comments about world events at the time of writing – such as we often find in Heidegger's lecture courses. Much more importantly, I suggest, one of its central themes is crucial to understanding *why* Heidegger moved into a position of critical distance from the regime, because it is an attempt to comprehend what lies behind these events. This is the notion of the politics of calculation, the issue of measure, which relates closely to Heidegger's late concerns with technology. Outside of Heidegger's own work I believe this has an important political potential.

This article therefore moves through a number of stages. Although I believe the *Beiträge* is central to Heidegger's work as a whole, I will largely confine myself here to relating it to texts from the same historical period, notably the lecture course on *European Nihilism* from 1940, and one on the issue of logic from 1934.[7] First, through a discussion of the title of the book under consideration, I suggest that the issue of measure is important to the work. I then show how the notion of measure is understood very differently in Protagoras and Descartes, and how understanding this development is useful in seeing how Heidegger believes calculation is crucial to the forgetting of being. Having established the importance of this modern, calculative, understanding of measure, I outline some

of the ways Heidegger makes use of this in political analyses – around notions of machination, race and worldview. This is where some of his most explicit criticisms of the Nazi regime can be found. The final section recognizes the limited success of Heidegger's proposed solution to these problems, but suggests that there may be something in his work that allows valuable insight into contemporary political problems. Taking the measure of the *Beiträge*, and pointing out its explicit political context, is therefore valuable in evaluating Heidegger's own career, his political position and politics more generally.

The Public Title and the Suitable Heading

The *Beiträge* is a forbidding book, uncompromising in its complexity of both style and content. It makes lots of allusive comments to other parts of Heidegger's œuvre and to western thought in general. The difficulties inhere in its very title: *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. Heidegger notes that *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Contributions to Philosophy) is its 'public or official title (*der öffentliche Titel*)', as it is the one given to the public, the one prepared for the public to consume. It necessarily sounds bland, because essential titles have become impossible, the genuine relation to the word has been destroyed (GA65, p. 3).[8] But the official title is not alone: 'the suitable, conformable or appropriate heading (*Die gemäße Überschrift*) therefore reads *Vom Ereignis*' (GA65, p. 3).

Now this *gemäße*, which is an uncommon word, has an ambiguity. Why does Heidegger think that the alternative to the 'public title' is a 'suitable heading'? It might mean, as Emad and Maly translate, 'the proper title', that is the *real*, or correct title, the one for which the public is not ready, although the clear differentiation Heidegger introduces between *Titel* and *Überschrift* is not respected here. As the name of the section has it, it is the 'essential (*wesentliche*) heading' (see also GA65, p. 80). However, *gemäße* does not simply mean appropriate or suitable to the matter at hand, but to the wider realm. This is important to consider in the time Heidegger was writing. *Maß* derives from *messen*, to measure or gauge; *Ge-* denotes a bringing together: *Gemäße* is a bringing together of measure. The related *Gemäßheit* was a word revived by National Socialism. Meaning conformity or accord, it was a word that was used to denote the removal of dangerous elements. It therefore bears comparison to *Gleichschaltung* – unification, synchronization, political coordination, bringing into line, the elimination of opposition, of discord. *Schalten* is to direct, govern or rule; *Schaltung* is connection or wiring. Because *Gleich* means same or identical this implies a making similar, a forced conformity, an ordering around a prescribed norm.[9] Why then does Heidegger use the word *gemäße* here? While I am not suggesting that he is buying into this contemporary usage, I do believe that its use is not insignificant. As I will go on to argue, the role of measure is crucial to the purpose of the work.

Equally, there is a complexity inherent in the term *Ereignis*. Contrary to Emad

and Maly who propose 'enowning', I would suggest 'propriation' as a translation. This is justified by the way Heidegger uses the words *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigenlichkeit* in *Being and Time*. Though these are usually translated as 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity', due to the existentialist interpretation, the word *eignen* has the sense of 'to own', in terms of property, but also 'to be proper', 'to be suitable'; *eigen* is 'own'. The most felicitous translations of *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigenlichkeit*, suggested by Krell almost as an aside, may be 'proper' and 'inappropriate'.[10] The prefix *er-* has the sense of a bringing forth, a bringing about. *Ereignis*, usually translated as 'event', therefore has the sense of a propriation, or an *ap*propriation. Heidegger is playing with a number of meanings at once, which are well preserved in the English 'propriation' and related words, with the senses of proper, property, peculiarity, suitability, own, owning, ownership, belonging, appropriation. As Derrida notes, *Ereignis* is a 'word which is difficult to translate', and he suggests 'event (*événement*) or propriation inseparable from a movement of depropriation, *Enteignen*'.[11] We note here, given the political context, how 'propriety' can also mean fitness or suitability, conformity with rule or principle. However, we should note that, despite the seeming relation, the root of *Ereignis* is not actually *eigen* but *Augen*, 'eye'.[12] It therefore has important links with the discussion of the *Augenblick*, 'the blink of an eye', or 'moment', throughout Heidegger's work.[13] Heidegger is therefore able to play with its apparent relation to *eigen* and its etymological relation to *Augen*. From 1936 the word *Ereignis* is 'the guiding word (*Leitwort*)' of Heidegger's thinking,[14] and occurs in most of his later texts. The earlier key terms of 'being' (*Sein*) and 'time' (*Zeit*) are brought into their own (propriated) by propriation. This is therefore a piece that speaks *of*, *on*, *about* propriation, but also *from* propriation. The thought is *propriation*, the thought is *propriated*.

But the title is only a way into the matter for thinking. It might name the matter, but it also frames the matter. It provides a guide, a way in, a measure of the matter. This emphasis on words is not arbitrary. As Klemperer points out,

> Nazism permeated the flesh and blood of the people through single words, idioms and sentence structures which were imposed on them in a million repetitions and taken on board mechanically and unconsciously . . . Words can be like tiny doses of arsenic.[15]

Heidegger's analysis of words is one of the most important aspects both of his thought, and of his coming to terms with the Nazi regime. As a word of caution, I hasten to add that an inquiry into the role of measure is only one way into, through and beyond this text. Measure plays a role, however, and is central to understanding the way being has come to be forgotten. It is also crucial to understanding the political. What then is the role of 'measure' within this work?

Calculation, Forgetting and the Preparation of Technology

One of Heidegger's central claims in *Being and Time* is that we have forgotten the question of being. Traditional philosophy, for Heidegger, has neglected the question of being in favour of studying beings. It is for this reason that, at the very beginning of the book, he quotes the passage from Plato's *Sophist* where the Eleatic stranger wonders what is meant by the expression 'being'.[16] In the *Beiträge*, Heidegger suggests that there are three things that cause us to forget being: three concealments (*Verhüllungen*). These are calculation (*die Berechnung*), acceleration (*die Schnelligkeit*), and massiveness (*Massenhaften*). As we might expect from the three terms, the second two are dependent on the first. Calculation is grounded by the science or knowledge of the mathematical, and is set into power by the machination of technology. This is somewhat ambiguous, and could seem to suggest that calculation is dependent on technology, but the suggestion is the reverse: technology is dependent on calculation, which is grounded in a particular way of thinking the mathematical. Technology merely makes this more apparent. This sense of calculation requires all things to be adjusted in this light; the incalculable is only the not yet calculable, and *organization* is given priority. Acceleration, or the celebration of quantitative enhancement, particularly celebrated by the Futurists, is likewise so grounded, and massiveness is a particular way of reckoning, based on number and calculation (GA65, pp. 120–1).

Heidegger suggests that it is with Descartes that this shift in understanding the mathematical occurs. He suggests that the notion of *ratio* – the related comprehension of *nous* and *logos* – is found in Aristotle, but with Descartes *ratio* becomes 'mathematical' (GA65, p. 457). We can see this in Descartes's *Geometry*, where he boasts that 'all problems in geometry can be simply reduced to such terms that a knowledge of the lengths of certain straight lines is sufficient for their construction'.[17] Later in the same work he suggests that 'in the method I use all problems which present themselves to geometers reduce to a single type, namely, to the question of finding the values of the roots of an equation'.[18] In other words, geometric problems can be reduced to equations, the length of lines: a measure of *quantity*, a problem of *number*. This is not the case in Aristotle, where geometry is fundamentally different from arithmetic, because the mode of connection is different.[19] In Descartes, the *continuum* of geometry is transformed into a form of arithmetic. Geometrical lines and shapes are conceived in terms of numerical coordinates, which can be divided: the very nature of a body, *res extensa*, for Descartes, is that it is divisible.[20]

To illuminate the importance of this shift, it is worth considering an important discussion from 1940, in a lecture course on Nietzsche entitled *European Nihilism*. Here Heidegger discusses Protagoras' saying 'πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εστιν ανθρωπος (panton chrematon metron estin anthropos)',[21] which is

usually translated as 'man is the measure of all things'.[22] At first he suggests 'one might suppose that it is Descartes who is speaking here' – before clearly distancing himself from that way of reading it: 'we would be falling prey to a fatal illusion if we wished to presume a sameness (*Gleichartigkeit*) of basic metaphysical positions here on the basis of a particular sameness (*Gleichheit*) in the words and concepts used' (GA48, pp. 175–6; N IV, pp. 91–2).

Heidegger suggests that 'experienced in a Greek way, the human of the basic relationship with beings is μέτρον, measure (*Maß*)'. What he means is that they let 'their confinement (*Mäßigung*, moderation) to the . . . restricted radius (*Umkreis*) of the unconcealed become the basic trait of their essence' (GA48, p. 178; N IV, p. 94). The ellipsis masks Heidegger's qualification that the restriction is particular (*jeweilige*) to the individual; his use of the word 'unconcealed' (*Unverborgenen*) is intended to make us think of the notion of *aletheia*, which Heidegger translates in this way, rather than the common 'truth'. In other words, to be the measure of all things – for the Greeks – is that the human lets themselves be revealed through the disclosing of *aletheia*. The measure of all things is the human.

In Descartes the position is somewhat different. Heidegger suggests that:

> The 'mathematical' is a standard of measure (*maßgebend*) for Descartes' conception of knowledge and knowing. But it remains for us to ask here, does Descartes simply take the already present and practised form of 'mathematical' knowledge as the model for all knowledge, or does he on the contrary newly define – in fact, metaphysically define – the essence of mathematics? The second is the case. (GA48, p. 201; N IV, pp. 113–14)

The mathematical – conceived in a new way – is the measure. Now, of course, Descartes's understanding of *res extensa* is dependent on his understanding of *res cogitans*, the human subject, the initial 'I am'. As Heidegger suggests:

> Descartes anticipated the metaphysical ground of the modern age – which is not to say that all subsequent philosophy is simply Cartesianism. But in what way did the metaphysics of Descartes preground the metaphysical ground of the new freedom in the modern age? What kind of ground must it have been? . . . The ground could not have been anything other than the human itself, because the sense of the new freedom forbade him any bond or commitment that did not arise from his own postings. (GA48, p. 187; N IV, p. 102)

Later in the same course he adds:

> Descartes, with his principle of the *cogito sum*, forced open the gates of the domain of such a metaphysically comprehended domination. The principle that lifeless nature is *res extensa* is simply the essential consequence of the first principle. *Sum res cogitans* is the ground, the underlying (*der Grund, das zum Grunde Liegende*), the *subiectum* for the determination of the material world as *res extensa*. (GA48, p. 205; N IV, p. 117)

As Heidegger notes in the *Beiträge*, the establishment of individual identity grounds the identity of other things. The principle of identity 'A = A' is 'grounded (*gegründet*) in I = I (*Ich = Ich*)', rather than 'I = I as an exceptional instance of A = A' (GA65, p. 201).[23] The fundamental determination of the world is extension, *res*

extensa, but this is grounded on thinking, *res cogitans*. A human notion becomes the measure of all things.[24]

Our view of the world is therefore not only shaped by our perception, but it is also limited by it. Kant puts this succinctly, when he suggests that, instead of our knowledge conforming to experience, our experience must conform to our knowledge.[25] Kant, however, conceives this as an absolute, Heidegger as a historical development.[26] The ontological foundation of modern science – this notion of calculation – acts to limit the ontic phenomena it, and we, are able to experience and to encompass. 'The step taken by Descartes is already a first and decisive consequence (*Folge*), a "compliance" (*Folgeleistung*) by which machination assumes power as transformed truth (correctness), namely as certainty' (GA65, p. 132). It is worth noting here an important discussion of the notion of exactness in science. For Heidegger, the concept of 'exact' is ambiguous. We usually understand it to mean precise or accurate (*genau*), measured from (*abgemessen*), careful (*sorgfältig*), but if that is so then all sciences are exact in that they are careful to use the method appropriately. But 'exact' can also be seen to mean 'determined, measured and calculated according the measure of numbers (*zahlenmäßig bestimmt, gemessen und errechnet*)', and then 'exactness is the character of the *method itself*, not merely how it is used' (GA65, pp. 149–50). In order for science to have some purchase on its subject matter, it must work with the way that subject matter is determined. When the modern concept of nature is conceived – as it is by Descartes – as 'accessible only to quantitative measuring and calculation', science must be exact (GA65, p. 150). Elsewhere, Heidegger cites Max Planck's statement that 'that is real which can be measured'.[27] But in so doing, making measure the determination, science allows what is essential to slip through our fingers. Though putting a stone on a scale will measure its heaviness as a calculated weight, a number, the burden has escaped us.[28]

But though, like Heidegger, we might want to criticize this conception of the material world, of nature, as *res extensa*, it has enormous consequences. The modern notion of measure, which derives from Descartes, sees beings as calculable, as quantitatively measurable, but as a determination of the world, 'it is the first resolute step through which modern machine technology, and along with it the modern world and modern mankind, become metaphysically possible for the first time' (GA48, pp. 204–5; N IV, pp. 116–17). The modern physical theory of nature prepares the way not simply for technology but for the *essence* of modern technology, which is not in itself technological, but is a way of seeing things as calculable, mathematical, extended and therefore controllable. Technological domination means the destruction (*Zerstörung*) of nature (GA45, p. 53). This is the modern worldview, worldpicture (*Weltbild*), the world as picture.[29]

Calculation and the Political

What has been shown by the examination of Protagoras and Descartes is that in the first case measure is taken from the world to understand the human; in the second a human notion of measure is used to understand the world. This shift is crucial to understanding Heidegger's intent, and, I suggest, his politics. How does Heidegger's criticism underpin his attitude, post-1934, to the National Socialist party? Overstating the case though he does, Derrida is onto something when he suggests that 'we cannot understand what Europe is and has been this century, what Nazism has been, and so on, without interrogating what made Heidegger's discourse possible'.[30] A weaker, and more tenable claim is that, as he is the most important philosopher so closely associated with Nazism, examining Heidegger's writings of the time may shed some light on the wider political situation. The *Beiträge* is crucial here, indeed as Jean Greisch suggests, its publication was brought forward from the plan Heidegger outlined at his death precisely to 'allow the insinuation that until the end of the war and perhaps even beyond he had been a Nazi wolf disguised in the shepherd of being's clothing to be refuted'.[31]

I stated in the introduction that Heidegger's political involvement has been comprehensively explored in recent years, and that I would not rehearse the facts here. However, lest there be any doubt in my position, let me be quite explicit. Heidegger believed that National Socialism had the potential to address many of the problems he perceived – in the University, in Germany, and in the world – and he therefore threw himself behind the movement, putting his thought at its service. In his lecture course on Plato's myth of the cave from 1932, for example, Heidegger suggests that

> . . . the ruling and rule-ordering of the state should be guided through by philosophical humans who, on the basis of the deepest and widest, freely questioning knowledge, bring the measure and rule (*Maß und Regel*), and open the routes of decision (*Entscheidung*).[32]

While it might be tempting to see this as 'just an account of Plato's *Republic*',[33] the previous sentence, which suggests that 'this does not mean that Professors of philosophy should become chancellors of the Reich (*Reichkanzler*), but that philosophers must become *phylakes*, guardians', shows that this is not the case.[34] Heidegger is suggesting a way in which the notion of measure relates to the political, and is explicitly offering his services to the state, an offer that was partly taken up as he assumed the Rectorship.[35]

As Gillespie suggests, 'Heidegger himself had no doubts that his earlier thought was compatible with at least some idealised version of Nazism'.[36] Gillespie continues to suggest that Heidegger 'never abandoned his support for the *ideals* of National Socialism' (my emphasis) and that 'coupled with his unremitting criticism of other contemporary political possibilities, there is little doubt that Heidegger continued to regard the Nazi movement as the most

promising political development of his time'.[37] What is in danger of being missed here, however, is why Heidegger offered 'unremitting criticism' of other political positions – notably Bolshevism and Americanism – and why National Socialism in practice, *if not in theory*, was equally a failure.[38] As I noted in the introduction, while investigations of why Heidegger allied himself to National Socialism in the first place, and why he continued to believe it had potential for greatness are important, the aim of this piece is to look at why he felt it had failed in practice.[39] The reason for the criticism of the regime and its ideas is above all the arguments outlined in this article: the calculation and domination of the world through the measure of technology.

Heidegger utilizes this understanding of calculation, of measure, to discuss a number of issues, notably time and space.[40] As I have shown elsewhere, Heidegger is concerned with elaborating a non-mathematical understanding of these terms.[41] Equally there is also an important discussion of 'the gigantic' (*Das Riesenhafte*) (GA65, pp. 441–3), which would bear fruitful comparison with contemporary discussion of 'globalization'.[42] Rather than conceive of globalization as a radical break with modern, state-based, territorial politics, we can recognize that it is, ontologically at least, the same, merely extending the calculative understanding of space to the globe instead of a single nation. Similarly, the remarks on the link between 'the machine and machination (technology)' may illuminate this and related contemporary issues:

> The machine, its essence. The service that it demands, the uprooting that it brings. 'Industry' (operations (*Betriebe*)); industrial workers, torn from homeland and history (*Heimat und Geschichte*), exploited for profit. Machine-training, machination and business. What recasting of man gets started here? (World-earth?) Machination and business (*Machenschaft und das Geschäft*). The large number, the gigantic, pure extension (*Ausdehnung*) and growing levelling off and emptying. Falling necessarily victim to kitsch and imitation (*Unechten*). (GA65, p. 392)

This is more carefully elaborated in section 74, which is entitled '"Total Mobilisation" as Consequence of Originary Forsaking of Being', Heidegger takes issue with the putting to use of the resources of the country, the economic plans and so forth. He characterizes 'total mobilisation' (*totale Mobilmachung*), a notion developed in Ernst Jünger's work, as 'purely setting-into-motion'.[43] The masses (*der Massen*) are put to service, but, Heidegger asks, 'for what?' (GA65, p. 143).[44] It becomes increasingly clear to Heidegger, especially in the *Nietzsche* lectures given in the period 1936–40, that neither Nietzsche nor Nazism is a solution to the problem of technology and the spectre of nihilism. As he suggests in 1940, the modern 'machine economy', 'the machine-based calculation of all activity and planning', requires new kinds of humans: 'it is not sufficient that one possesses tanks, airplanes and communication equipments; nor is it sufficient that one has humans, who can service them . . . only the Over-man (*Übermensch*) is appropriate to an absolute "machine economy"'. It was Descartes who 'forced open the gates of this domain' (GA48, pp. 204–5; N IV, pp. 116–7).

Somewhat presciently, given the turn toward environmental politics in recent years, Heidegger mournfully remarks that the human

> . . . might for centuries yet pillage and lay waste to the planet with their machinations, the gigantic character of this driving might 'develop' into something unimaginable and take on the form of a seeming rigour as the massive regulating of the desolate as such – yet the greatness of being (*Seyn*) continues to be closed off. (GA65, p. 408)

Such themes are extensively discussed in later essays of Heidegger's, particularly 'The Question of Technology'. It is striking though that the *Beiträge* dates from more than a decade before, and that the former anticipates so many of the later essays' concerns. Indeed, realizing the explicitly political context of the development of these ideas may be extremely useful in understanding some of their more problematic claims.[45]

Race and the Biological

A related discussion is made of the biological, racial discourse of Nazism. It is often accepted, even by many of his sternest critics, that Heidegger was critical of this area of Nazi thought. We find this in his 1929/30 lectures *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, and in the first lecture course on Hölderlin, as well as throughout the *Nietzsche* lectures.[46] However, the most explicit discussion of the doctrine of *Volk* is found in none of these places, but rather in a 1934 course *Logic as the Question of the Essence of Language* and to a lesser extent in the *Beiträge*. Indeed, in the *Beiträge* (GA65, p. 48) Heidegger refers us back to this lecture course. Equally, in 1966 he mentions these lectures, and suggests that here, along with the first course on Hölderlin and the *Nietzsche* lectures there is 'a confrontation with National Socialism'.[47] In his 1945 letter to the Rector of Freiburg he is more explicit:

> During the first semester that followed my resignation I conducted a course on logic and under that title, the doctrine of *logos*, treated the essence of language. I sought to show that language was not the biological-racial essence of man, but conversely, that the essence of man was based as language as a basic reality of *spirit*. All intelligent students understood this lecture as well as its basic intention. It was equally understood by the observers and informers who then gave reports of my activities to Krieck in Heidelberg, to Bäumler in Berlin, and to Rosenberg, the head of National Socialist scientific services.[48]

In the lecture course, Heidegger suggests that 'Logic is the science of *logos*, of speech (*Rede*), strictly speaking of language (*Sprache*)' (GA38, p. 13). The question of logic is one of language, and relates to the crucial questions 'What is the human?' and 'Who are we?' This leads Heidegger to the question of the *Volk*, which is the notion of the human writ large (GA38, p. 67). Heidegger gives a number of politically charged examples of the use of the term *Volk*, and asks if the same thing is being meant in all of these cases (GA38, p. 61). He goes on to challenge the idea that the *Volk* can be simply reduced to biology. The notion of the

Volk is not solely something which is rooted in the body, but has associations with spirit and soul. Race is something which Heidegger does associate with the body, and therefore his notion of *Volk* is trying to dissociate itself from crude, biological, racism (see GA38, pp. 61, 65–6). The *Volk* is crucially related to a notion of *logos* – language.

Heidegger suggests that 'language is the management (*Walten*) of world-pictures and the preserving middle of the historical Dasein of the Volk (*geschichtlichen Daseins des Volkes*)'. In other words, language links the *Volk* to their historical existence. As Heidegger continues, 'only where temporality itself temporalises (*Zeitlichkeit zeitigt*), does language happen (*geschieht*); only where language happens, does temporality temporalise' (GA38, p. 169). This linking back to the language of *Being and Time* is crucial in understanding how he is philosophizing politics rather than simply politicizing his philosophy. The key summary suggestion of this course is that 'the being of the *Volk* is neither the mere presence of a population (*Bevölkerung*) nor animal-like being (*tierhaftes Sein*), but determination (*Bestimmung*) as temporality and historicality' (GA38, p. 157). There is more to the people than a calculative understanding of population; the introduction of *logos*, time and history disassociate them from animals.

In the *Beiträge* Heidegger characterizes the people of today as fleeing into 'new' contents, and though their conceptions of the 'political' and the 'racial' were 'previously unknown', they are merely 'dressings for the old facade of School-Philosophy', that is metaphysics (GA65, pp. 18–19). He later claims that 'all biologisms and naturalisms . . . stay within the soil (*Boden*) of metaphysics' (GA65, p. 173). Although it is a common metaphor, the use of *Boden* is not insignificant. A central term within Nazi language, Heidegger is here turning it around, suggesting that being rooted in the soil shows the limited nature of these claims, that they remain within the problematic they seek to exceed. A similar claim is made later: 'all doctrines which focus on "values", "meaning", "ideas" and ideals; correspondingly, the doctrines which deny such, like positivism and biologism' still remain within Platonism (GA65, p. 218).[49] He similarly criticizes the 'metaphysics' of Richard Wagner and Houston Stewart Chamberlain (GA65, p. 174); in the first Hölderlin course he derides the 'contemporary snivelling about national character, blood and soil'.[50] Heidegger is not so much suggesting an alternative way of conceptualizing race on the basis of spirit, as suggesting that biological racial thinking falls within the remit of metaphysics. I have argued elsewhere, drawing on Foucault, that there was racism before that was non-biological, non-metaphysical; but this was recoded and utilized in the new scientific version. As thinking generally becomes more scientific, mathematical, calculative, so too does racism – biological and medical.[51]

This recently published course goes therefore some way towards indicating Heidegger's position, but as Bernasconi has importantly pointed out, it is not as straightforward as Heidegger might have us believe. While Heidegger might be critical of National Socialist understandings of race, this does not mean that he

escapes what we might understand by the term 'racism'.[52] Bernasconi argues that one can be a racist without determining race biologically, and that many National Socialists did not sign up to this view.[53] While Heidegger rejects the idea that the *Volk* can be reduced to biology, his own view of the *Volk* is ambiguous. Although he recognizes that *Volk* is itself an ambiguous term, he gets into some quite serious problems when he attempts to articulate an alternative. As Bernasconi suggests, 'the text of the 1934 lecture course thus supports Heidegger's subsequent claim that he opposed biological racism, but not that he proposed in its place an account of language framed in terms of *Geist*'.[54]

Heidegger is clearly treading on dangerous ground when he discusses the notion of *Volk*. In the *Beiträge* the most important section is number 15 (GA65, pp. 42–3). The section heading reads 'Philosophy as "Philosophy of a People (*Volkes*)"'. Who could deny this is the case, Heidegger asks? We have Greek philosophy and German philosophy – this seems self-evident. But in truth, none of this comes close to what philosophy itself is – philosophy is not something like clothing or a style of cookery which can be understood as peculiar to a people. Almost as a throwaway, Heidegger declares that 'it is sheer nonsense to say that experimental research is Nordic-Germanic and rational research comes from *foreigners!* We would then have to already count (*zählen*) Newton and Leibniz among the "Jews"' (GA65, p. 163). Equally such a claim to national philosophy rests upon a problematic term, 'people', *Volk*. Heidegger suggests that the forgetting of being shows itself particularly in failing to note the ambiguity of what is deemed essential: his example is the question of the 'people' and related terms such as 'community, the racial, the lower and higher, the national' (GA65, p. 117). Equally, alongside the discussion of *Volk* there is a discussion of another crucial Nazi term, 'decision' (*Entscheidung*) (GA38, pp. 56–60, 70–7; GA65), which Heidegger had used himself in his 'measure and rule' comment.[55] Now surely to question what were taken as central terms in Nazi parlance, even if only to fall back on problematic notions himself, is risking censure.

It is interesting, not to say perverse, that such commentary has only just appeared. Heidegger published several lecture courses during his own lifetime; some of which included material that was clearly incriminating. And yet, in a number of places there are remarks which would seem to show his 'spiritual resistance'[56] more clearly. This is particularly true in the lectures on Nietzsche, published as a book in 1961, and then as the original manuscripts in the *Gesamtausgabe*, which appeared in the late 1980s. Much of the most political material – and that means often critical of the Nazi regime – was cut from the 1961 version. See, for example, the critique made of the notions of 'new order' (*Neue Ordnung*) and *Lebensraum* which are described as symptoms of a much wider malaise, namely nihilism and the culmination of metaphysics in technology (GA48, pp. 139–41).[57] But as Bernasconi perceptively points out, many of these texts show that Heidegger's coming to terms with the Nazi regime was far from one-sided or unequivocal. He is not advocating a notion of *Volk* free from

race, but recognizing how the two concepts are complicit, and precisely because of their determination within metaphysics (GA38, p. 65). This criticism is sufficiently convoluted for there to have been a real purpose in having a clear, officially authorized, account given after the war, which the original manuscripts would have muddied and complicated.[58]

Worldview, Machination and Lived Experience

Heidegger's earliest extant lecture course, the *Kriegsnotsemester* (War Emergency Semester) of 1919, was entitled *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*. Here he suggests that worldview (*Weltanschauung*) is 'the task of philosophy' and that '*therefore* a philosophical-historical consideration of the manner in which philosophy performs this task' is an essential enquiry (GA56/57, p. 8). In the *Beiträge*, Heidegger suggests that '"Worldview", like the domination of "world-pictures" is an outgrowth [or tumour – *Gewächs*] of modernity, a consequence (*Folge*) of modern metaphysics' (GA65, p. 38). It is interesting to note here that a word given important currency by the National Socialist movement – who saw their 'system' of beliefs to be a *Weltanschauung* rather than an ideology[59] – is criticized in a way which is akin to Nazi medical discourse: worldview is a tumour, a festering sore on the problem of modernity.

One of the problems of worldviews is their totalizing aspect. If they claim to regulate all kinds of action and thinking, then necessity (something which would be outside their control) is necessarily a problem. The idea of creativity, questioning the ground on which they stand, is impossible. Creativity becomes replaced by operations or management (*Betrieb*). We can note here the clear relation this has to the notions of *Gemäßheit* – conformity or accord – and *Gleichschaltung* – political coordination, bringing into line – the removal of dangerous elements, the elimination of opposition, the bringing under a common measure. Heidegger suggests that, though they are incompatible, total political faith (*totale politische Glaube*) and total Christian faith are nevertheless both engaged in adjustment (*Ausgleich*) and tactics. This is because they share the same essence (*Wesens*). Their total posture (*totalen Haltunzugrunde*) makes their struggle (*Kampf*) 'not a creative one, but rather "propaganda" and "apologetics"' (GA65, p. 41). Totalitarianism is dependent on this totalizing understanding of the world, this conception of worldpicture. Somewhat cryptically, Heidegger suggests that:

> Worldview is always 'machination' over and above what is passed to us, with the aim of overcoming and subduing it, with the means which are proper to, prepared by, though not brought to fruition – all of this slid over into 'lived-experience'. (GA65, p. 38)

The first part of this follows from what has been thus far discussed. The second, however, the link to the notion of 'lived-experience', is worth a little explanation. Elsewhere Heidegger asks 'What does machination mean?', and answers 'machi-

nation and constant presence: *poiesis – tekhne*. Where does machination lead? To *lived-experience*' (GA65, p. 107).[60] In a lecture course delivered at the time the *Beiträge* was being written, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, Heidegger explains:

> At the beginning of modern thought, Descartes for the first time posited the certainty of the ego (*Ichgewißheit*), in which the human is made secure of beings as the object of their representations, and is the germ of what today, as 'lived experience' and 'experience' ('*Erlebnis' und 'Erleben'*), constitutes the basic form of being human. It is one of the ironies of history that our age has discovered – admittedly very late – the need to refute Descartes, and takes issue with him and his 'intellectualism' by appealing to 'lived experience', whereas 'lived experience' is only a base descendant of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*. (GA45, p. 149)

A concept appealed to – particularly by the Nazi regime[61] – as a more authentic, more rooted way of dealing with the world than the cold calculation of technology is grounded in the same way of thinking which takes a human notion as the measure of all things. In the *Beiträge* Heidegger is even more explicit:

> Now, however, since beings are abandoned by being (*Seyn*), the opportunity arises for the most insipid 'sentimentality'. Now for the first time everything is 'experienced' (*erlebt*) and every undertaking and performance drips with 'lived-experience' (*Erlebnisse*). And this lived-experience proves that now even the *human* as a *being* has incurred the loss of being (*Seyn*) and has fallen prey to their hunt for lived-experiences. (GA65, pp. 123–4)[62]

This is despite his own use of the term in a number of places. Particularly interesting is the lengthy discussion in the *Kriegsnotsemester* lecture course. Even here, though, he recognizes that 'the term "lived experience" (*Erlebnis*) is today so faded and worn thin that, if it were not so fitting, it would be best to leave it aside. Since it cannot be avoided, it is all the more necessary to understand its essence' (GA56/57, p. 66). To understand its essence, Heidegger suggests that it can be characterized as 'event, or propriation (*Er-eignis*), in that it is meaningful, and not thing-like)' (GA56/57, p. 69). It is therefore not simply an occurrence, but what makes an occurrence possible.

The key example of an *Erlebnis* in this course is our way of encountering a lectern. Heidegger suggests that when his students come into the lecture room they go to *their* usual place. He suggests they put themselves in his place – when he comes into the room he sees a lectern. Does he see it as brown surfaces, at right angles? Does he see it as a largish box with a smaller one on top of it? No. Rather he sees a lectern, which he has spoken at before. He does not first see the surfaces, then the surfaces as a box, then the purpose of it; rather a lectern, within an environment. The lectern only becomes an issue if it is too high, or there is something – a book, for example – obstructing its use. This way of taking an everyday object and discussing how we experience it is reminiscent of the kitchen table in the later lecture course *Ontology: The Hermeneutic of Facticity* or the hammer in *Being and Time*. Heidegger goes on to argue that a Black Forest farmer or a native from Senegal would experience the lectern in a different way. The farmer would equally not see the lectern as a box, but as the 'place for the

teacher'; the native as something 'which he does not know what to make of'. Heidegger calls the latter 'instrumental strangeness' (GA56/57, pp. 70–3). But in all cases essentially the same thing is happening:

> In seeing the lectern I am fully present in my 'I'; it resonates with the experience, as we said. It is an experience proper to me and so do I see it. However it is not a process (*Vorgang*), but rather a *propriation* (*Ereignis*) (non-process, in the experience of the question a residue of this propriation). Lived experience (*Das Er-leben*) does not pass in front of me like a thing, but I appropriate (*er-eigne*) it to myself, and it appropriates itself according to its essence. If I understand it in this way, then I understand it not as process, as thing, as object, but in quite a new way, as propriation. (GA56/57, p. 75)

Rather than the Cartesian division of subject and object, the division of human from the world, grounded on the *cogito* and the split between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, we have a way of understanding that looks at the way we comport ourselves always already within a world (*Welt*). Heidegger's hyphenated term being-in-the-world, used in *Being and Time*, shows that what we call 'being' is indivisible from the world or environment (*Umwelt*). As he puts it in the *Kriegsnotsemester*, 'es weltet', 'it worlds'. This use of the impersonal 'it' is related to Heidegger's interest in the term *es gibt*, which literally means 'it gives', and has the sense of 'there is', in the impersonal sense of the French *il y a*.[63] For Heidegger, both in this early lecture course and the *Beiträge*, it is *Ereignis* that *gives* being, time, space. In opposition to the worldview, to the view the human has of the world, the grid they use to comprehend, order and exploit the world, the world rather gives to us the view, the comportment.[64] It is this sense of experience, as a propriation, an *Ereignis*, that can be used to refute Descartes, rather than the 'lived-experience' that too stems from Descartes. Rather than the human being the measure of all things, the measure of all things is the human.

Heidegger's Problematic Solution

It is instructive to compare Heidegger's characterization of the Nazi regime and modern metaphysics, and indeed, his own 1932 offer of 'providing the measure and rule' with Hölderlin's poetry, specifically the piece known by its first line, 'In lovely blueness'. A crucial line, much cited by Heidegger, is the question 'is there a measure on the earth? There is none (*Gibt es auf Erden ein Maß? Es gibt keines*)'. Rather, measure comes from the divinity – 'Is God unknown? Is he manifest as the sky? This rather I believe. It is the measure of the human. Full of acquirements, but poetically, the human dwells on this earth'.[65] There is not the space here to discuss the role of divinity or the last god within the *Beiträge*, let alone the problematic relationship of Heidegger to theology, but we can make some comments about how *this* notion of measure relates to that of propriation.[66]

Three related claims can be pointed to here, that bring into play the notions of propriation, history (*Geschichte*, rather than *Historie*) and *Dasein* (human existence, literally 'being-the-there'). First, Heidegger notes that *Ereignis* does not

allow itself to be measured in conventional ways: 'Immeasurable (*Unausmeßbar*) are the riches . . . the fullness of propriation is incalculable (*unerrechenbar*)' (GA65, p. 7). Second, Heidegger notes that 'in philosophical knowing a change in the man who understands begins with the first step, and not in a moral-"existentiell" sense, but with *Dasein* as measure (*sondern da-seinmäßig*)' (GA65, p. 14, see pp. 316, 407).[67] Finally, the suggestion that 'overall the issue is to think, and thus to *be* historically (*geschichtlich*), instead of calculating historiographically (*historisch zu rechnen*)' (GA65, p. 505, see pp. 421–2, 492–4; GA38, p. 87). Thinking historically, thinking the notion of *Ereignis*, through a preparatory analytic of *Dasein*, can provide insight into the question of being that metaphysics and the calculative mode of casting beings cannot achieve.[68]

Heidegger is doing little more here than providing a signpost towards an alternative. I am uncomfortable with seeing this as a solution to the problematic Heidegger defines, and yet feel that his insight into that problem is enormously useful as a means of illuminating contemporary concerns. Would Heidegger's idealized or 'private' National Socialism have been the same as that which held sway until 1945? Unquestionably not. Is Heidegger's thinking of race without a basis in biology but perhaps grounded in spirit able to escape criticism? Certainly not. Would his programme have been a solution or a new beginning to the problems faced by the modern world? I sense not, and equally think that it would need to be criticized and probably condemned. As Derrida has importantly shown, Heidegger's thought, like Nietzsche before him, is entangled within the metaphysics it seeks to exceed or twist free from.

But within Heidegger's work, especially here in the *Beiträge*, whose ideas, potentials and insights I have barely begun to exploit, there remains something I feel is worthy of close examination. The understanding of Descartes's calculative casting of being, reducing the world to a problem of number, of quantity, is an important contribution to our understanding of modernity. Extending that to an immanent critique (too immanent, of course) of the Nazi period provides valuable insights into what was *behind*, in an ontological sense, that regime. If it stops short of moral outrage and blanket criticism, we may actually learn more: it is not really much of a challenge for us today to condemn Nazism, but to *understand* it, and what made it *possible* is a more difficult task. His alternative may be no better, and certainly no solution, but his diagnosis may still be of use. Heidegger's work here bears careful comparison with – among others – Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Foucault's analysis of racism in '*Il faut défendre la société*', and, more recently, Zygmunt Bauman's *Modernity and the Holocaust*.[69] All of these thinkers are in some way dependent on Heidegger's insights.[70]

More broadly though, the metaphysical determination of the world – that to be is to be calculable – is useful in a much wider enquiry. That is to understand the notion of the 'political' not sociologically, or empirically, or, to use Heidegger's term, ontically, but *ontologically*. It is my contention that two of the

foundational terms of modern politics – territory and population – are in need of careful investigation in this way. Just as there is something *quantitatively* different between Descartes's geometry and that of Aristotle or Euclid – there is something *quantitatively* different between earlier conceptions of political space and the conception of which the Peace of Westphalia is the most striking example. The rise of statistics – the description of *states* – the transformed understanding of population, the popularity of utilitarianism and, indeed, the understanding of the study of politics as political *science* are all related to the calculative revolution.

Taking the measure of the *Beiträge* is crucial to understanding the relation of calculation to the political. In showing how these modern notions can be investigated at a much more fundamental level than the usual historical or sociological analyses, at the level I call historical ontology, my aim in this larger project is to show how mathematics and politics intersect, through a *geometry of the political*. Calculation, the taking of measure, is key to the *constitution* of the modern state.

Abbreviations for Works by Martin Heidegger

GA: *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975ff.

GA38: *Logik als Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*. 1998.

GA45: *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik'*. 1984. Tr. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer as *Basic Problems of Philosophy: Selected 'Problems' of 'Logic'*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

GA48: *Nietzsche: Der Europäische Nihilismus*. 1986. Edited version tr. as 'European Nihilism', in *Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism*, tr. Frank Capuzzi, ed. David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 4 vols, 1991. References are made as N IV.

GA56/57: *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*. 1987. Tr. Ted Sadler as *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*. London: Athlone, 2000.

GA65: *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. 1989. Tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly as *Contributions to Philosophy: Of Enowning* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

The majority of texts translated from the *Gesamtausgabe* have the pagination of the German version at the top of the page or within the text, allowing a single page reference. Exceptions are noted above.

Notes

1. Though I make extensive use of this translation, because of its problems, translations in what follows are often revised.
2. This appears on the dust-jacket of the German version, and has been picked up by e.g. Parvis Emad (1991) 'The Echo of Being in *Beiträge zur Philosophie – Der Anklang*: Directives for its Interpretation', *Heidegger Studies* 7: 15–35. George Kovacs (1996) 'An Invitation to Think through and with Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*', *Heidegger Studies* 12: 17–36. On the *Beiträge* generally, see also Jean Greisch (1989) 'Études Heideggeriennes: Les "Contributions à la philosophie (A partir de l'*Ereignis*)" de Martin Heidegger', *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 73(4): 529–48. Kenneth Maly

(1991) 'Soundings of *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*', *Research in Phenomenology* 21: 169–83. Reiner Schürmann (1999) 'Ultimate Double Binds', in James Risser (ed.) *Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, pp. 243–67. New York: State University of New York Press. George Kovacs (1999) 'The Power of Essential Thinking in Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*', in Babette E. Babich, *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy and Desire: Essays in Honor of William J. Richardson, S.J.*, pp. 37–53. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Richard Polt (1999) *Heidegger: An Introduction*, pp. 140–52. London: UCL Press. Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu and Alejando Vallega (eds) (2001) *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

3. In a marginal note to the 'Letter on "Humanism"', Heidegger suggests that the work of the *Beiträge* speaks 'another language' to that of metaphysics, but that it remains in the background of published writings such as the Letter. See Martin Heidegger (1976) *Wegmarken*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, p. 145 n. a. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. (1998) *Pathmarks* (ed.) William McNeill, p. 239 n. a. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Among many others, see Richard Wolin (ed.) (1993) *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Victor Farías (1989) *Heidegger and Nazism*, tr. Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Hugo Ott (1993) *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, tr. Allan Blunden. London: HarperCollins. Hans Sluga (1993) *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
5. See e.g. Dominique Janicaud (1990) *L'Ombre de cette pensée: Heidegger et la question politique*. Grenoble: Jérôme Millon. Julian Young (1997) *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miguel de Beistegui (1998) *Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias*. London: Routledge.
6. On Heidegger and the Four Year Plan, see Theodore Kisiel (2001) 'Heidegger's Philosophical Geopolitics in the Third Reich', in Richard Polt and Gregory Fried, *A Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 242–3, 324–5 n. 22. New Haven: Yale University Press.
7. Equally, though there are some important related themes developed in two other of Heidegger's manuscripts, treatment of them will also be withheld. See (1997) *Besinnung*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 66. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. (1998) *Die Geschichte des Seyns*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 69. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
8. See Martin Heidegger (1967) *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 11th edn. Tr. Edward Robinson and John Macquarrie as Heidegger (1962) *Being and Time*, e.g. p. 127. Oxford: Blackwell. 'Séminaire du Thor 1966', in (1966–76) *Questions*, vol. 4, p. 371, for his disdain of 'publicity'. Paris: Gallimard, 4 vols.
9. For discussions of *Gleichschaltung*, see Victor Klemperer (2000) *The Language of the Third Reich: LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook*, tr. Martin Brady, pp. 154–8. London: Athlone. Berel Lang (1990) *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, p. 93. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Henry Friedlander (1980) 'The Manipulation of Language', in Henry Friedlander and Sybil Milton (eds) *The Holocaust: Ideology, Bureaucracy and Genocide: The San José Papers*, p. 108. Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publishers. Gordon A. Craig (1982) *The Germans*, p. 326. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
10. David Farrell Krell (2000) *The Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art, and Affirmation in the Thought of Jacques Derrida*, p. 118. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
11. Jacques Derrida (1991) *Donner le temps*, vol. 1, *La Fausse monnaie*, p. 33. Paris: Éditions

Galilée; see (1987) 'Le Retrait de la métaphore', in *Psyché: Inventions de l'autre*, p. 76. Paris: Éditions Galilée.

12. See Polt, *Heidegger* (n. 1), p. 146.
13. See Stuart Elden (2001) *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History*, ch. 2. London: Continuum. William McNeill (1999) *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
14. Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (1976, in n. 3), p. 148 n. a.; *Pathmarks* (1998, in n. 3), p. 241 n. b.
15. Klemperer (n. 9), p. 15. See Lang (n. 9), ch. 4. Friedlander (n. 9). Craig (n. 9), pp. 322–8. George Steiner (1967) 'The Hollow Miracle' and 'A Note on Günter Grass', in *Language and Silence: Essays 1958–1966*, pp. 117–32, 133–40. London: Faber & Faber. John Wesley Young (1991) *Totalitarian Language: Orwell's Newspeak and its Nazi and Communist Antecedents*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
16. Heidegger (1962, in n. 8), p. 1.
17. Descartes (1954) *The Geometry of René Descartes*, French–Latin–English edn, tr. David Eugene Smith and Marcia L. Latham, pp. 2–3. New York: Dover.
18. Ibid. pp. 216–17.
19. See Martin Heidegger (1992) *Platon: Sophistes*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 19. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Tr. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer as Heidegger (1997) *Plato's Sophist*, §15. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
20. René Descartes (1964ff.) *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, in *Oevres de Descartes*, (ed.) Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, vol. 7, pp. 85–6. Paris: Vrin, 13 vols. For a more detailed account, see Stuart Elden (2001) 'The Place of Geometry: Heidegger's Mathematical Excursus on Aristotle', *The Heythrop Journal* 42(3): 311–28.
21. See Plato, *Theaetetus*, in (1900) *Platonis Opera*, (ed.) Johannes Burnet, vol. 1, 152a. Oxford: Clarendon.
22. See Plato (1987) *Theaetetus*, tr. Robin A.H. Waterfield. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (1992) *Theaetetus*, tr. M.J. Levett, revised by Myles Burnyeat. Indianapolis: Hackett.
23. Of course, the German *Ich* is often translated, as in Freud, as the Latinate *ego*.
24. For a discussion, see David Farrell Krell (1971) 'Nietzsche and the Task of Thinking: Martin Heidegger's Reading of Nietzsche', pp. 53–9. PhD thesis, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University. On Heidegger's reading of Descartes generally, see Robert Bernasconi (1987) 'Descartes in the History of Being: Another Bad Novel?', *Research in Phenomenology* 17: 75–102.
25. Immanuel Kant (1956) *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. Kant (1993) *Critique of Pure Reason*, (ed.) Vasilis Politis, Bvxi. London: J.M. Dent.
26. See Stuart Elden (2003) 'Reading Genealogy as Historical Ontology', in Alan Rosenberg and Alan Milchman (eds) *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
27. Martin Heidegger (1978) 'Wissenschaft und Bessinung', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 54. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 4th edn. Heidegger (1977) 'Science and Reflection', tr. William Lovitt in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, p. 169. New York: Harper & Row.
28. Heidegger (1977) *Holzwege*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 5, p. 35. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heidegger (1993) *Basic Writings*, (ed.) David Farrell Krell, p. 172. London: Routledge, revised and expanded edn. See GA 65, 275–6.
29. Heidegger's 1938 lecture 'The Age of the World Picture' is clearly central here. While this contemporaneous piece remains Heidegger's clearest presentation of the ideas, to my mind it never quite reaches the depth or potential of the discussion in the *Beiträge*. See Heidegger (1977a) 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes', in *Holzwege* (n. 28). Heidegger (1977b) 'The Age of the World Picture', in *The Question Concerning Technology* (n. 27).

30. Jacques Derrida (1987) 'On Reading Heidegger: An Outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium', summary by David Farrell Krell, *Research in Phenomenology* 17: 178.
31. Greisch (n. 22), p. 605. Specifically, it was Farías (n. 4) that initiated the recent furore, and, Greisch suggests, the publication of the *Beiträge*. The original plan had been to publish the *Beiträge* only when all the lecture courses had appeared. See Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrman, 'Editor's Epilogue', GA65, 512–13. A contrary view of the political importance of the *Beiträge* is taken by George Kovacs (1992) 'The Leap (*der Sprung*) for Being in Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*', *Man and World* 25(1).
32. Martin Heidegger (1988) *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 34, p. 100. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
33. Anonymous referee's report on this paper, undated.
34. See also Martin Heidegger (1996) *Correspondance avec Karl Jaspers*, (ed.) Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, tr. Claude-Nicolas Grimbert, followed by *Correspondance avec Elizabeth Blochmann*, tr. Pascal David, pp. 271–2. Paris: Gallimard. For a more detailed discussion see Elden (n. 13), pp. 68–9.
35. See the uses made of Plato in the Rectoral Address itself: Heidegger (1983) *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität; Das Rektorat 1933/34: Tatsachen und Gedanken*, (ed.) Herman Heidegger. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann; Tr. William S. Lewis in Wolin (n. 4). See Graeme Nicholson (1987) 'The Politics of Heidegger's Rectoral Address', *Man and World* 20(2).
36. Michael Allen Gillespie (2000) 'Martin Heidegger's Aristotelian National Socialism', *Political Theory* 28(2): 140. See Kathryn Brown (1990) 'Language, Modernity and Fascism: Heidegger's Doubling of Myth', in John Milfull (ed.) *The Attractions of Fascism: Social Psychology and the Aesthetics of the 'Triumph of the Right'*, p. 147. New York: Berg. For a more penetrating analysis of Heidegger's relation to the movement, see Charles Bambach (2003) *Heidegger's Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
37. Gillespie (n. 36), p. 140.
38. See e.g. the suggestion that the Germans 'only limp behind these metaphysical times. The English Empire was there long ago and was entangled in its essential phases'. Martin Heidegger (1990) *1. Nietzsches Metaphysik 2. Einleitung in die Philosophie: Denken und Dichten*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 50, p. 82. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
39. On the continued appeal of the *idea* of National Socialism, see the notorious interview with *Der Spiegel*, published only after his death: 'Only a God Can Save Us', in Wolin (n. 4).
40. See e.g. GA65, pp. 191–4, 207–8, 371–88.
41. See Elden (n. 13), chs 1–3.
42. See Kisiel (2001) 'Heidegger's Philosophical Geopolitics in the Third Reich' and 'Measuring the Millennial Moment of Globalization against Heidegger's Summer Semester 1935, and Other Politically Incorrect Remarks', *Current Studies in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics* 1(1), http://ereignis.org/csph/Vol_01_winter01/kisiel.htm.
43. Ernst Jünger (1960) 'Die Totale Mobilmachung', in *Werke*, vol. 5. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 10 vols. Tr. Joel Golb and Richard Wolin as 'Total Mobilisation' in Wolin (n. 4).
44. The notions of 'military service' and 'labour service' play a central role in Jünger's *Der Arbeiter* (in *Werke*, vol. 6). Heidegger utilizes them and sets up the idea of 'knowledge service' in his Rectoral Address.
45. I have in mind particularly the scandalous comparison of mechanized agriculture with the Holocaust, famine and hydrogen bombs. Heidegger suggests they share the same essence

(not that they are in essence the same). What they share is the essence of modern technology; what distinguishes the first from the subsequent is a particular conception of the political – although Heidegger does not make this at all clear. See Martin Heidegger (1994) *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 79, p. 27. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. For a discussion, see Elden (n. 13), pp. 74–8.

46. Martin Heidegger (1992) *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*, Gesamtausgabe Band 29/30. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Tr. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker as Heidegger (1995) *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Heidegger (1980) *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 39. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
47. Heidegger (n. 39), p. 101.
48. Heidegger, 'Letter to the Rector of Freiburg University', in Wolin (n. 4), p. 64.
49. Heidegger's view, throughout the *Nietzsche* lectures and elsewhere, is that that value-philosophy – putting a value on something – is another version of calculation, and remains within metaphysics.
50. Heidegger (1980, in n. 46), p. 254.
51. See Stuart Elden (2002) 'The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's "*Il faut défendre la société*" and the Politics of Calculation', *boundary 2* 29(1), 125–51. Michel Foucault (1997) '*Il faut défendre la société': Cours au Collège de France (1975–1976)*. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard.
52. Robert Bernasconi (2000) 'Heidegger's Alleged Challenge to the Nazi Concepts of Race', in James E. Faulconer and M.A. Wrathall (eds) *Appropriating Heidegger*, p. 52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
53. Ibid. p. 52. On the problem of *Geist*, see also Jacques Derrida (1990) *Heidegger et la question: De l'esprit et autres essais*. Paris: Flammarion.
54. Bernasconi (n. 52), p. 54.
55. Heidegger (n. 32), p. 100.
56. Heidegger (n. 48), p. 65.
57. On the new order and the state, see also GA38, p. 143.
58. This seems a more plausible reading than that of Dennis J. Schmitt, 'Strategies for a Possible Reading', in Scott et al. (n. 2), p. 40, who suggests that in the *Beiträge* 'the critique of Nazi racial policy is clear and unmistakable'.
59. See Klemperer (n. 9), pp. 98, 142–3. Young (n. 15), p. 71.
60. A few pages on he writes '*Machination* (*poiesis – tekhne – kinesis – nous*) has a correspondence which was long held back and only now finally emerges with "*Lived-experience*"' (GA65, p. 132).
61. Klemperer (n. 9), p. 244: 'The word utilised most powerfully and most commonly by the Nazis for emotional effect is "*Erlebnis* {experience}"'.
62. On life in the *Beiträge* see David Farrell Krell (1992) *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life Philosophy*, ch. 6. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
63. On the use of 'es gibt' in the *Kriegsnotsemester*, see Theodore Kisiel (1993) *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, esp. p. 42. Berkeley: University of California Press. The term appears in *Sein und Zeit*; *Being and Time* (n. 8), p. 212; and numerous other places in Heidegger's work.
64. See *Sein und Zeit*; *Being and Time* (n. 8), p. 211.
65. Friedrich Hölderlin, 'In lovely blueness . . .', in (1961) *Selected Verse*, tr. Michael Hamburger, German–English version, pp. 245–6. Harmondsworth: Penguin. See Werner Marx (1987) *Is there a Measure on Earth? Foundations for a Nonmetaphysical Ethics*, tr. Thomas J. Nenon and Reginald Lilly. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

66. See, however, Laurence Paul Hemming (2002) *Heidegger's Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
67. See also GA65, p. 249: 'Overflow (*Das Über-maß*) is no mere abundance of quantity, but the self-withdrawing of all estimating and measuring (*Schätzung und Ausmessung*). But in this self-withdrawing (self-sheltering) being (*Seyn*) has its nearest nearness in the clearing of the there (*Da*), in that it pro-priates Da-*sein*'.
68. See GA65, p. 20 for a linking of this to the *Augenblick*.
69. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1973) *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, tr. J. Cumming. London: Allen Lane. Foucault (n. 51). Zygmunt Bauman (1989) *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Polity. See also Craig (n. 9), p. 327: 'Much of the correspondence of Rudolph Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, was concerned with quotas and rates of disposal and sounded as if he were the manager of a synthetic firm of a factory for the conversion of waste materials'.
70. However, Berel Lang (1996) *Heidegger's Silence*, p. 98. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, describes taking Heidegger's analysis of technology 'as a basis for understanding the Holocaust itself' as 'a formulation that seems as dramatically revisionist as any other in Holocaust historiography'. See also Lang (n. 9) *Act and Idea.* Berel Lang (1999) *The Future of the Holocaust: Between History and Memory*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.