Jean Cavaillès, The Second Davos University Conference – new translation at Urbanomic. This is the event where Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer had their debate.
The translation is to mark the new translation of Jean Cavaillès, On Logic and the Theory of Science – Urbanomic, 2021 (UK sales; US sales), translated by Knox Peden and Robin Mackay. Preface by Gaston Bachelard. Introductory notice by Georges Canguilhem and Charles Ehresmann. Introduction by Knox Peden.
There is also a discussion of the book with Robin Mackay, Knox Peden and Matt Hare here.
… we present a young Jean Cavaillès’s report on the Second Davos University Conference, Easter 1929—the setting for a now legendary confrontation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger.
[Originally published as ‘Les deuxièmes Cours Universitaire de Davos’, in Die II. Davoser Hochshulkurser. Les IImes Cours Universitaires de Davos du 17 mars au 6 avril 1929 (Davos: Kommissionsverlag, Heintz, Neu, & Zahn, 1929), 65–81.]
With its stringent critiques of Kantianism, logicism, and Husserlian phenomenology, Jean Cavaillès’s On Logic and the Theory of Science, written in 1942-43, seeks to clear the ground for what was to be a full account of his philosophy of ‘mathematical experience’. Central to this philosophy is the need to reconcile the fact that mathematics unfolds as a ‘becoming’ with the necessity of its ‘concatenations’—both the chains of reasoning internal to mathematical theories and those that govern the order of their discovery. Cavaillès, that is, shuns any suggestion of a static, eternal register in which mathematical necessity could ultimately be isolated from the unfolding of these concatenations, or from the work that enables them to be formulated; but he also refuses to make the becoming of mathematics conditional upon either the consciousness within which it emerges or the symbols in which it is embodied. In other words, for Cavaillès, to insist on the autonomy of mathematics entails that the combined necessity and processual character of mathematics can be grounded neither in a final instance of consciousness nor in an apodictic set of operations reducible to formal tautology...