Cyril Welch’s version of Heidegger’s Being and Time: An Annotated Translation has been published by Yale University Press, in the United States in February, and the United Kingdom in May 2026. A fuller discussion of the translation, its choices and terminology, and the editorial apparatus provided is far beyond what I will attempt here. But I thought it might be interesting to pick one theme and look at a few indicative passages between the translations we now have available – John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson’s initial one from 1962, the one by Joan Stambaugh, the revision of Stambaugh by Dennis J. Schmidt, and now the one by Welch.
It is worth noting immediately that Welch does not provide German terms in brackets in the text. “For my own translation I chose not to call attention to the German underlying the English—not ever. An exercise in taking responsibility for my own rendition” (“Postscript”, p. 557). His notes point to other texts by Heidegger, or others, rather than highlight translation choices, which he discusses in part in the “Postscript” and the “Index of Topics”. It’s also worth noting that the latter is organised by his English translation choices, not the German words, so it’s not always clear what the choices are.
Stambaugh’s translation was in progress for decades before its 1996 publication, and Schmidt is a revision from 2010 but not a wholesale reworking of it. One key change is that he adds quite a lot of German in brackets in the text. Welch therefore provides the first entirely new translation for a generation. It was many decades in the making, and its publication seemed interesting. It’s worth noting that while Stambaugh, Schmidt and Welch have the earlier translations to compare to, or criticise, and all the secondary literature discussing the book and its terminology, Macquarrie and Robinson were forging a path. (Relatedly, I’ve come to have a new appreciation for some of Foucault’s earliest translations when thinking about how to rework his texts.) I discuss a bit how some of the early English translations were shaped by Heidegger himself, by Hannah Arendt and David Farrell Krell, on the basis of Krell’s recollections and some correspondence, here.
The theme for a comparison here is space and spatiality, my first interest in Heidegger, dating back to my PhD thesis in the late 1990s, later published as my first book Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History (Continuum, 2001; and on Scribd here). I went through the passages and ideas I took from Heidegger in my discussion there and compared Welch to earlier translations and the German.
I’ve provided the German, then Macquarrie and Robinson, occasionally the Stambaugh and Schmidt versions, before moving to Welch. Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation is the version I know best. It was the one I read first, and it was an important text for me, for reasons I’ve said before, in part because it led me to the German, which I tried to muddle through alongside their version. I read the Stambaugh translation later, and while I bought the Schmidt revision, have never worked through it systematically. It was published after my last focused work on Heidegger, Speaking Against Number: Heidegger, Language and the Politics of Calculation (Edinburgh University Press, 2006).
The German page numbers are in the margins of all the translations, and also in the version in the Gesamtausgabe. This makes it easy to compare passages, but I’ve provided the page numbers of the translations as well. I’ve tried to ensure I accurately replicate the punctuation, quotation marks and translator interpolations in brackets as they appear in the texts quoted. My only additions are ellipses within braces {…} to mark text I’m moving over for the purpose of comparison.
The first term is the most obvious: Welch translates Dasein as “being-there”. This was one of the earliest choices in Heidegger translation, parallel to the French être-là. Da, there, and Sein, being. Except that the term also means existence, and not simple spatial position, as Heidegger indicates. “There-being” or even “being-the-there” have also been suggested, with the most common attempted resolution not to translate the term. It is so associated with Heidegger that its multiple meanings are one of the first things a new reader encounters. That’s the decision made in all the previous English translations of the entire book, though Stambaugh follows Heidegger’s later preference for it to be Da-sein (see her Preface, p. xxiv). Schmidt changes it back (see his Foreword, p. xx). But Welch has gone further back, or backwards, returning to some of the earliest English discussions of “being there”.
The second is In-der-Welt-Sein, ‘Being-in-the-world’ for Macquarrie and Robinson, “being-in-the-world” for Stambaugh, or for Welch “being-in-world”. Macquarrie and Robinson generally capitalise Being when translating Sein, which has given rise to all sorts of problems in anglophone discussions. I’m pleased to see Welch resists capitalising being here, and more generally, as Stambaugh did before him. Welch is also dropping the definite article with “being-in-world”, which has a jarring effect but which I quite like. Heidegger is at pains to say that it is not primarily spatial, in the sense of a being placed in a world. He says the same about “being in”, it is not like water in a glass.
Was besagt In-Sein? Den Ausdruck ergänzen wir zunächst zu In-Sein »in der Welt« und sind geneigt, dieses In-Sein zu verstehen als »Sein in…« {…} In-Sein ist demnach der formale existenziale Ausdruck des Seins des Daseins, das die wesenhafte Verfassung des In-der-Welt-seins hat (Sein und Zeit, pp. 53-4).
What is meant by “Being-in”? Our proximal reaction is to round out this expression to “Being-in ‘in the world’”, and we are inclined to understand this Being-in as ‘Being in something’ [“Sein in…”] {…} “Being-in” is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state(Macquarrie and Robinson, pp. 79-80).
What does being-in mean? This expression we initially extend to read being-in-“world” and find ourselves inclined to understand this being-in as “being-inside…” {…} Accordingly, being-in is the formal existential expression of the being of being-there – of that one being essentially constituted by its being-in-world (Welch, p. 68).
There are some differences here, with “Being in something” or “being-inside” for “Sein in”, as a contrast to “Being-in”/“being-in” for “In-Sein”, beyond Dasein.
Der Raum ist weder im Subjekt, noch ist die Welt im Raum. Der Raum ist vielmehr »in« der Welt, sofern das für das Dasein konstitutive In-der-Welt-sein Raum erschlossen hat (Sein und Zeit, p. 111).
Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Space is rather ‘in’ the world in so far as space has been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein (Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 146).
Space is neither in the subject nor the world in space. Rather, space is “in” the world since the being-in-the world constitutive for Da-sein has disclosed space (Stambaugh, p. 103; Schmidt, p. 108).
Neither is space in the [human] subject, nor is the world in space. Rather, space is ‘in’ world—inasmuch as the being-in-world constitutive for being-there has disclosed space (Welch, p. 141).
Welch adds “[human]” before subject, which seems unnecessary, beyond the changes to the translation of Dasein and dropping the article before world.
Wenn wir so das In-Sein abgrenzen, dann wird damit nicht jede Art von »Räumlichkeit« dem Dasein abgesprochen. Im Gegenteil: Das Dasein hat selbst ein eigenes »Im-Raum-sein«, das aber seinerseits nur möglich ist auf dem Grunde des In-der-Welt-seins überhaupt {…} Das Verständnis des In-der-Welts-seins als Wesensstrucktur des Daseins ermöglicht erst die Einsicht in die existentziale Räumlichkeit des Daseins (p. 56)
By thus delimiting Being-in, we are not denying every kind of ‘spatiality’ to Dasein. On the contrary, Dasein itself has a ‘Being-in-space’ of its own; but this in turn is possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world in general {…} Not until we understand Being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein can we have any insight into Dasein’s existential spatiality (Macquarrie and Robinson, pp. 82-83).
This contrast with being-in does not at all deny every kind of “spatiality” for being-there. On the contrary: being-there has its own “being-in-space”—one that, however is only possible on the basis of its being-in-world {…} Only the understanding of being-in-world as an essential structure of being-there makes possible any insight into the existential spatiality of being-there (Welch, p. 71).
Again, most of the differences are around the keywords already discussed. Some of the sentences are very similar.
Elsewhere, Umwelt is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as “environment”, but Welch goes with “circum-world”.
Welt meint die »öffentliche« Wir-Welt oder die »eigene« und nächste (häusliche) Umwelt (Sein und Zeit, p. 65).
“world” may stand for the ‘public’ we-world, or one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) environment (Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 93).
Macquarrie and Robinson follow this with a note that explains how Umwelt means something close to “world around” or the “world about” (p. 93 n. 1). Stambaugh has “surrounding world” (p. 61), which is unchanged by Schmidt (p. 65). This is one where I prefer Stambaugh, though “milieu” might also work. Welch goes with a new term which makes sense, but probably more if you know the concept already:
World can mean the “public” world of the we, or one’s “own,” one’s most intimate (domestic) environment, one’s circum-world” (p. 83).
Heidegger returns to the question of spatiality in the important §70. A reading of this whole section between translations might be interesting. Here’s one key passage in all the available versions:
Es füllt nicht wie ein reales Ding oder Zeug ein Raumstück aus, so daß seine Grenze gegen den es umgebenden Raum selbst nur eine räumliche Bestimmung des Raumes ist. Das Dasein nimmt – im wörtlichen Verstande – Raum ein. Es ist keineswegs nur in dem Raumstück vorhanden, den der Leibskörper ausfüllt {…} Das Sicheinräumen des Daseins wird konstituiert durch Ausrichtung und Ent-fernung. (Sein und Zeit, p. 368).
Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of equipment would, so that the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that space spatially. Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally. It is by no means just present-at-hand in a bit of space which its body fills up {…} Dasein’s making room for itself is constituted by directionality and de-severance (Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 419; with an explanatory note on taking space in).
Da-sein does not fill out a piece of space as a real thing or a useful thing would do, so that the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that space spatially. In the literal sense, Da-sein takes space in. It is by no means merely objectively present in the piece of space that its body fills out {…} The making room of Da-sein is constituted by directionality and de-distancing (Stambaugh, p. 336).
Dasein does not fill out a piece of space as a real thing or a useful thing would do, so that the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that space spatially. In the literal sense, Dasein takes space in. It is by no means merely objectively present in the piece of space that its corporeal body [Leibkörper] fills out. {…} The making room of Dasein is constituted by directionality and de-distancing (Schmidt, p. 350).
It does not fill out a piece of space, neither as a real thing nor as an instrument, so that the boundary separating it from the surrounding space would itself be a spatial determination of space. In common parlance, being-there arranges space [arranges for space, and only thereby “takes up” space]. It is by no means merely on hand in the piece of space that a body fills out {…} The making-room essential to being there is constituted by directionality and de-stancing (Welch, pp. 464-65).
Aside from the odd capitalisation of “Real Thing” by Macquarrie and Robinson, this passage is important for some of the spatial terms, particularly “directionality” (chosen by all) and “de-severance”, “de-distancing”, and “de-stancing”. The latter doesn’t read right to me, not least because it isn’t an English word. This passage also highlights words relating to Zeug, usually “equipment” or “item of equipment”, or “useful thing” for Stambaugh, but for Welch “instrument” and related words. One example comes earlier in the book with Wohnzeug, a Zeug for dwelling:
Das Nächstbegegnende, obzwar nicht thematisch Erfaßte, ist die Zimmer, und dieses wiederum nicht als das »Zwischen den vier Wänden« in einem geometrischen räumlichen Sinne – sondern als Wohnzeug (Sein und Zeit, p. 68)
What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing (Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 98).
What first of all arises for encounter, although not as something thematically comprehended, is the room, and this in turn not as something “between four walls” in a geometrical sense—rather as instrumental for dwelling (Welch, pp. 87-88).
Another discussion of Zeug words comes in a different spatial passage.
Für den, der zum Beispiel eine Brille trägt, die abstandmäßig so nahe ist, daß sie ihm auf der »Nase sitzt«, ist dieses gebrauchte Zeug umweltlich weiter entfernt als das Bild an der gegenüber befindlichen Wand {…} Das Zeug zum Sehen, desgleichen solches zum Hören, zum Beispiel der Hörer am Telephon, hat die gekennzeichnete Unauffälligkeit des zunächst Zuhandenen (Sein und Zeit, p. 107).
When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantially that they are ‘sitting on his nose’, they are environmentally more remote from them than the picture on the opposite wall {…} Equipment for seeing—and likewise for hearing, such as the telephone receiver—has what we have designated as the inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand. (Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 143).
Stambaugh is close to this, though has “this useful thing is further away in the surrounding world” (p. 99); Schmidt revises to “this useful thing is further, in being used, further away in the surrounding world” (p. 104), which probably doesn’t need “further” twice. Welch is different:
For example, for those who wear glasses, which are distance-wise so near they are “in front of their nose,” this instrument, when in use, is circum-worldly farther away than the picture hanging on the wall across the room {…} An instrument for seeing—or for hearing—as a telephone receiver—has the inconspicuousness we early characterised as belonging to what is initially at hand” (Welch, p. 136).
Another important change is that Macquarrie and Robinson’s “ready-to-hand” for Zuhandenen becomes “at hand” for both Stambaugh (p. 99) and Welch (here, p. 136). The contrasting term Vorhandenheit is “presence-at-hand” (Macquarrie and Robinson), “objective presence” (Stambaugh, followed by Schmidt), “on-hand-ness” (Welch). Welch therefore makes a contrast between things “at hand” and “on hand”.
Das »Oben« ist »an der Decke«, das »Unten« das »am Boden«, das »Hinten« das »bei der Tür«; alle Wo sind durch die Gänge und Wege das alltäglichen Umgangs entdeckt und umsichtig ausgelegt, nicht in betrachtender Raumausmessung festgestellt und verzeichnet (Sein und Zeit, p. 103).
The ‘above’ is what is ‘on the ceiling’; the ‘below’ is what is ‘on the floor’; the ‘behind’ is what is ‘at the door’; all ‘wheres’ are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement of space. (Macquarrie and Robinson, pp. 136-37; see Stambaugh, p. 96, Schmidt, p. 101).
What’s “above” is what’s “on the ceiling,” what’s “below” is what’s “on the floor,” what’s “behind” is what’s “at the door”; all wheres are uncovered and circumspectly interpreted in the course of everyday dealings, they are not ascertained and registered in observational acts of measuring things out in space (Welch, p. 131).
This discussion in this post is obviously not comprehensive. It picks just one theme which was important to me, and reads some passages across the different editions. Looking at Welch’s “Index of Topics” suggests some other choices which might be interesting to discuss: Befindlichkeit as “attunement”, Eigentlichkeit as “authenticity”, and others. At some point I might look at the more political issues I discussed in Speaking Against Number: Heidegger, Language and the Politics of Calculation, or history, or other aspects. But it seems to me the discussion of spatiality already indicates some of the differences and a few of the possible issues in reading this new translation.
Martin Heidegger editions used
Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 17th edition, 1993 [1927].
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.
Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: SUNY Press, 1996.
Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, rev. Dennis J. Schmidt, Albany: SUNY Press, 2010.
Being and Time: An Annotated Translation, trans. Cyril Welch, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2026.
This is the 73rd post of a weekly series, posted every Sunday throughout 2025, and continuing into a second year. The posts are short essays with indications of further reading and sources. They are not as formal as something I’d try to publish more conventionally, but are hopefully worthwhile as short sketches of histories and ideas. They are usually tangential to my main writing focus, a home for spare parts, asides, dead-ends and possible futures. I hope there is some interest in them. They are provisional and suggestions are welcome. A few, usually shorter, pieces in a similar style have been posted mid-week. I’m not sure I’ll keep to a weekly rhythm throughout 2026, but there will be at least a few more pieces.
The full chronological list of ‘Sunday histories’ is here, with a thematic ordering here.
